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Abstract
This Article focuses on the case of Islamic Investment Company of the Gulf (Bahamas) Ltd.
v. Symphony Gems N.V. & Others (“Symphony Gems”). Symphony Gems is the first instance
where a Western court of law ruled on an Islamic financial transaction. Symphony Gems illuminates the challenges and tensions within the industrial complex of Islamic finance as it seeks
to exist and thrive in a commercial reality where the regulatory framework and its associated assumptions (both theoretical as well as those of commercial practice) differ markedly from those
of Islamic law and the contemporary Islamic financial industry. The resulting transactions often
deviate from the classical modes or forms upon which they are supposed to be based. From a
conventional finance perspective, Islamic transactions can be criticized as being anomalous, inefficiently structured and obliquely documented. Symphony Gems arose out of the applicability of
an Islamic financial contract known as a murabahah. This Article will explain both the conceptual
basis and the contemporary usage of the murabahah contract and, more generally, the challenges
of integrating Islamic financial concepts into the Anglo-American legal system that predominates
the modern global economy. Murabahah contracts, simply stated, involve the sale of an item,
through a middleman, in which the ultimate buyer is aware of the middleman’s costs in obtaining the item. As discussed later in this Article, murabahah contracts in contemporary practice
closely approximate conventional financing mechanisms, particularly the economics underlying
a similarly-profiled conventional commercial financing. This is why murabahah contracts are so
popular. Therefore, it is not surprising that the first instance in which a Western court of law has
examined and opined upon an Islamic financial contract involves a murabahah sale.
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"Are ye requited aught save what ye used to earn?"
INTRODUCTION
The contemporary practice of Islamic banking and finance
("Islamic finance") is a burgeoning yet immature niche within
the global financial industry. Islamic finance can be set apart
from conventional finance as much due to its unique and sophisticated theoretical underpinnings, as to what the modern financial complex would view as peculiarities or idiosyncrasies. Those
characteristics, combined with the fact that Islamic finance exists
in a world in which finance and religious sensibilities 2 rarely con* Mr. Moghul is Managing Partner in the Metropolitan New York office of the law
firm Ahmed & Moghul LLP. All copyright and other intellectual property rights in
connection with this Article are heldjointly by Umar F. Moghul and Arshad A. Ahmed.
** Mr. Ahmed is Managing Partner in the Northern California office of the law
firm Ahmed & Moghul LLP.
All translations are the work of the authors.
It is our humble hope that this Article may contribute to the body of literature
proving that the accusation of unprincipled lawmaking in Islam has more to do with the
plight of Islam in the modern world, namely the intellectual errors of the Islamic world
in dealing with modernity, rather than any organic element of Islamic jurisprudence.
1. THE QUR'AN 10:52 (Marmaduke Pickthall trans., 1930).
2. We use the expression "religious sensibilities" as distinguished from "ethical sensibilities" because the modern world has no shortage of recourse to what it calls ethics.
That ethics can be divorced from a religious context is implausible from the point of
view of Islamic wisdom, and that it so thoroughly has been in the modern world, starting in and with the West, is cause for intellectual and moral alarm, not least among
contemporary Western moral philosophers themselves. See generally ALASDAIR
MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (2d ed. 1984) (discussing the need for a paradigmatic return
to the will to virtue, the so-called way of Aristotle, in response to modernity's and postmodernity's destruction of any moral fabric other than the self-serving and inherently
immoral will to power, the so-called way of Nietzsche, which is none other than rational
self-egoism); cf HENRY VEATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS: FACT OR FANCY? (1985) (comparing
and contrasting the possibilities and consequences of basing a moral and legal regime
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verge, can challenge and inspire both lawyers and financiers.
Despite the difficulties due to current associations of Islam
with terrorism, Islamic finance continues to grow. Over the last
three decades, Islamic finance has grown to involve over three
hundred financial institutions in both Muslim countries and international financial markets including well over US$200 billion
in managed assets.3 Many observers estimate current growth
rates to be as high as fifteen percent per annum.4 The industry
is so young, however, that there is no reliable authoritative
source that might record and track those statistics, which have
been quoted for years throughout the Islamic finance world. As
with any emerging market - especially one that may boast
uniquely of over fourteen centuries' worth of jurisprudential
and intellectual treasury - the potential for further quantitative
and qualitative growth of Islamic finance vis-d-vis the global finance industry reflects a sense, at least among Muslims, of cautious optimism.
While the practice of Islamic finance has been a growing
niche within the modern financial complex (and, thus far, not
truly independent of it), its growth has not been accompanied
by the emergence of a coherent body of governing rules and
regulations native to the Islamic intellectual perspective. The Islamic financial institution, typically Western in its organizational
form and collective outlook, and the Shari'ah committee that
serves to provide Islamic legitimacy to the Islamic financial institution,5 are both newly emerging constructs that have been
on the first principles of either the will to power or the will to virtue, and insisting that
the only way a proper basis can ever be found for laws, values and ethics is by explicit
recourse to an objective reality, which is none other than the Divine Reality as manifested in the nature of things).
3. See Rodney Wilson, The Evolution of the Islamic Financial System, in ISLAMIC FiNANCE: INNOVATION AND GROWTH 29 (Rifaat Abdel Karim & Simon Archer eds., 2002);
see also The Institute of Islamic Banking and Insurance, Status of Islamic Banking, at
http://www.islamic-banking.com/ibanking/.
4. See FRANK E. VOGEL & SAMUEL HAYES, ISLAMIC LAW AND FINANCE: RELIGION, RISK
AND RETURN 5-6 (1998) (discussing generally the growth of the Islamic financial industry).
5. Typically, each Islamic financial institution hires, retains, and pays the salary of a
committee of Islamic jurists to issue fatwas [non-binding opinion] declaring each transaction in which the institution engages to be permissible according to Islamic law. Such
a committee is typically known as the Shari'ah committee. Before issuing its fatwa, the
Shari'ah committee usually assists the financial institution by instructing it as to how to
modify the transaction documents so that the transaction is not un-Islamic. The
Shari'ah committee awards its mark of compliance to transactions that it deems accept-

152

FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 27:150

given scant attention.6 Islamic finance has developed along
these lines because it has no status independent of its rival conventional finance. Indeed, Islamic finance inhabits a world as
the weaker, but in symbiosis with its dominant rival, conventional finance. The economics and financial technology underlying Islamic finance are none other than those of the modern
financial complex. In spite of the heavy influence of conventional finance on Islamic finance, there remains a hiatus of understanding between those who are engaged in Islamic finance
and those who are not.
Many observers have likened Islamic finance to ethical finance. Ethics in the modern day tends to be divorced from religion.' In contrast, Islamic finance remains closely tied to the
Islamic religion and, in large part, is founded on Muslims' attempts to live according to the Divine Will as evident in the
Shari'ah. From a modern finance perspective, the principal difficulty in understanding Islamic finance is understanding what it
means for finance to be based in religion. A practical question
yet to be systematically addressed by Western regulators and academicians is how Western financial and legal systems should deal
with the unique concerns and regulatory framework brought to
bear by Islamic finance.
Islamic finance has just begun to grapple with the application of Islamic law to modern circumstances such as contemporary business entities8 and how to address present-day commerable. Too often, in our experience, the fatwa issued by the Shari'ah committee is exceedingly brief, containing only conclusory statements on mere components of the
transaction. Astoundingly, there are no more than a dozen individuals serving in one
capacity or another, on nearly every Shari'ah committee of every Islamic financial institution worldwide. The issue of whether there exists a conflict of interest in this arrangement is only now beginning to receive treatment.
6. Do banks, as we understand them, exist under Islamic law? Is the concentration
of wealth in the hands of a few which might result from a "culture of banks" an acceptable phenomenon in Islam? Those are just some questions rarely asked in Islamic
banking circles. In contemporary practice, an Islamic bank, like a conventional bank,
acts as an intermediary and a trustee of other people's money. Unlike a conventional
bank, however, the typical Islamic bank purports, as least in theory, to share profits and
losses with its depositors. Though it may seem that profit- and loss-sharing introduces
an element of mutuality, most Islamic banks, especially the larger ones, are organized
much in the same way as their conventional corporate counterparts, i.e., with stratified
stakeholders, and not as mutuals.
7. See supra note 2 (noting the disconnect between ethics and religion).
8. See IMRAN AHSAN KHAN NYAZEE, IsLAMIC LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION: PARTNERSHIPS

(1999) (discussing from an Islamic legal perspective the theoretical underpin-
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cial practices from an Islamic point of view.9 For Islamic
thought, in general, there is no question that the principles of
Islam differ starkly from those of the modern West,"' and those
differences are no less evident when confining oneself simply to
a comparison of modern legal and financial systems to Islamic
finance. Those differences manifest themselves on the moral
and legal planes where Islamic finance strives, first, to engage in
transactions that do not contravene the substantive limits of the
Shari'ah, and second, to promote the universal principle of economic fairness.'"
Islamic finance has not come to terms with how best to go
about functioning in a regulatory framework dominated by another legal system with its own financial technology. In fact, IsRings of modern partnership forms); see also IMRAN AHSAN KHAN NYAZEE, ISLAMIC LAW
OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION: CORPORATION (1999) (discussing from an Islamic legal per-

spective the theoretical underpinnings of the modern corporation).
9. The Islamic legal process may validate custom ['ur] so long as certain conditions are met. Foremost amongst those conditions is that the custom be a prevalent
practice, reasonable and acceptable to people of sound nature, and consistent with the
texts [nusus]. Many scholars employ custom in the interpretation of the Qur'an and
the hadith, and also in issuingfatwas. For instance, whether a buyer of a defective good
has the right to return the good is based upon the prevailing custom of the community
where the sale has taken place. See MOHAMMAD HASHIM KAMALI, PRINCIPLES OF ISLAMIC
JURISPRUDENCE 283-95 (rev. ed., Islamic Texts Soc'y 1991) (1989). See also SEVED HosSEIN NASR, THE HEART OF ISLAM: ENDURING VALUES FOR HUMANITY 121 (2002) (positing
that custom or habit, whether mercantile or otherwise, is considered valid in the
Shari'ah itself if such a custom or habit does not contradict or contravene the
Shari'ah). See also Abdul Hakim & Sherman Jackson, ]fihad in the Modern World, 1 SEASONS 31, 35 (Spring/Summer 2003) (quoting the esteemed jurist al-Qarafi (d. 1285)
who stated: "Holding to rulings that have been deduced on the basis of custom, even
after this custom has changed, is a violation of Unanimous Consensus ('ijma') and an
open display of ignorance of the religion"). See also id. at 35 (quoting the Fifth Session
of the Islamic Law Academy of the Organization of the Islamic Conference: "No jurist,
neither as judge, nor as an issue of non-binding opinions ('fatwa'), may restrict himself
to that which has been handed down in the manuals of the classical jurists, failing in the
process to pay adequate attention to changes in custom").
10. See generally SEYYED HOSSEIN NASR, KNOWLEDGE AND THE SACRED 81-86 (1989).
Ultimately, this resolves to less a question of modernity and the way of Islam, and more
a question of modernity vis-d-vis all of known human tradition. See generally, RENE GUENON, THE REIGN OF QUANTITY AND THE SIGNS OF THE TIMES (Lord Northbourne trans.,
Luzac & Co., Ltd. 1953) (1930).
11. See NASR, supra note 9, at 144-47. Before modern times, economics and economic law in Islam were always combined with ethics and were understood as being an
organic part of the life of human beings, all of which should be dominated by ethical
principles. "[I]n fact, the modern Arabic word for economics, al-iqtisad [used to have]
the completely different meaning of 'moderation' or the just mean' in classical
Arabic." Id. at 144. See generally M. UMER CHAPRA, ISLAM AND THE ECONOMIC CHALLENGE
(1992).
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lamic finance now operates at a time when the Shari'ah is not
integrally practiced and enforced wholly as the law in any country. To exacerbate the problem, bankers and practitioners in Islamic finance, often trained solely in modern finance and banking methods, lack any traditional education and therefore, lack
any legitimate knowledge of Islamic law. On the other hand,
Shari'ah committee members, while educated in Islamic law and
jurisprudence, are not usually educated in modern finance and
economics. Thus, an intellectual barrier separates the two
groups that must meld in order for the challenges facing Islamic
finance to be properly addressed.
Islamic financial regulation, in its classical formulation,
comprised a plethora of schools of thought and positions on any
given legal or jurisprudential issue, and Islamic scholarship as a
whole celebrated such divergence of opinion. 2 With a backdrop of a multiplicity of interpretations within Islam, 3 the
guardians of the outward expression of Islam were the jurists
[fuqaha ],and the guardians of the inward tradition were the
spiritual masters. Both the inward and outward aspects of Islamic teaching have had their rightful place in Islam, and more
often than not, both these aspects have been integrated and present in one and the same person.
This Article focuses on the case of Islamic Investment Company
of the Gulf (Bahamas)Ltd. v. Symphony Gems N.V. & Others4 ( "Sym12. Four orthodox schools of Islamic law and jurisprudence survive to the present
day in the Sunni tradition: the Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i and Hanbali. In contrast to the
Sunni tradition, there is the Shi'ah tradition of Islamic thought, which comprises its
own schools of law and jurisprudence, the most notable being the Ja'fari. Only the
Sunni schools of law and jurisprudence are discussed in this Article. For more information concerning the schools of Islamic legal reasoning in the Sunni world, see GEORGE
MAKDISI,

THE RISE

(1981) and
9

OF COLLEGES:

CHRISTOPHER

INSTITUTIONS

OF LEARNING IN

ISLAM

MELCHERT, THE FORMATION OF THE SUNNI

AND

THE WEST

SCHOOLS OF LAW,

(1997). See also, KHALED ABou EL FADL ET AL., THE PLACE OF
6 (Joshua Cohen & Ian Lague eds., 2002) (stating "[t]raditionally,
Islamic epistemology tolerated and even celebrated divergent opinions and schools of
thought").
13. A comparison of the different opinions among schools and scholars leads inevitably to a discussion of dispensation and strictness. Dispensation is found where a particular school's ruling on a matter is easiest to implement and strictness is found where
it is difficult to implement. Traditional scholars of Islamic law and philosophy acknowledged that the differences among schools constituted a mercy on Muslims. See AHMAD
IBN NAQIB AL-MISRI, RELIANCE OF THE TRAVELER: A CLASSIC MANUAL OF ISLAMIC SACRED
LAw 38 (Nuh Ha Mim Keller trans., 1994).
14. 2002 WL 346969 (Q.B. Com. Ct. Feb. 13, 2002).
TH-AOTH CENTURIES C.E.

TOLERANCE IN ISLAM
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phony Gems"). Symphony Gems is the first instance where a Western court of law ruled on an Islamic financial transaction. Symphony Gems illuminates the challenges and tensions within the
industrial complex of Islamic finance as it seeks to exist and
thrive in a commercial reality where the regulatory framework
and its associated assumptions (both theoretical as well as those
of commercial practice) differ markedly from those of Islamic
law and the contemporary Islamic financial industry. The resulting transactions often deviate from the classical modes or forms
upon which they are supposed to be based. From a conventional
finance perspective, Islamic transactions can be criticized as being anomalous, inefficiently structured and obliquely documented.
Symphony Gems arose out of the applicability of an Islamic
financial contract known as a murabahah.'5 This Article will explain both the conceptual basis and the contemporary usage of
the murabahah contract and, more generally, the challenges of
integrating Islamic financial concepts into the Anglo-American
legal system that predominates the modern global economy.
Murabahah contracts, simply stated, involve the sale of an item,
through a middleman, in which the ultimate buyer is aware of
the middleman's costs in obtaining the item. 6 As discussed later
15. Murabahah is often defined as "cost plus mark-up sale." We have elected to
utilize the Arabic term in this Article not only because this translation would be cumbersome, but also because we do not believe any translation of which we know fully and
adequately expresses the Islamic legal concept.
16. See, e.g., J. Michael Taylor, Islamic Banking - The Feasibility of Establishing an
Islamic Bank in the United States, AM. Bus. L.J. 385, 395-96 (2003). Taylor explains that
[i]n a typical murabahah transaction, the financial institution acts as a middleman and purchases a good requested by its customer; the financial institution
then turns around and sells the good to the customer at the acquisition cost
plus a profit. The customer agrees to pay for the good over a stated period in
installments, but if there is a default (unlike in traditional financing) the customer is only liable to the financial institution for the contracted sale price
(not any fees or interest calculations otherwise available in typical financing
arrangements).
A key component of murabaha [sic] financing is the requirement that the financial institution actually own the good before transferring title to its customer. This is because the financial institution assumes some risk to justify its
profit, making the profit more than just disguised interest. The customer
could always refuse to accept the good obtained for it by the financial institution, causing the financial institution to find an alternative buyer with the accompanying costs of storage, marketing and overhead.
Id.
The problem with Taylor's description, however, is that it reveals a transaction that
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in this Article, murabahah contracts in contemporary practice
closely approximate conventional financing mechanisms, particularly the economics underlying a similarly-profiled conventional commercial financing. This is why murabahah contracts
are so popular. 17 Therefore, it is not surprising that the first instance in which a Western court of law has examined and opined
upon an Islamic financial contract involves a murabahah sale.
I. ISLAMIC FINANCE VIS-A-VIS CONVENTIONAL FINANCE
A. A Brief Word on Conventional Finance
Over the course of the last three decades, conventional finance has witnessed both an unprecedented tide of new instruments and techniques and a wide expansion across international
borders. Conventional finance or modern finance - we use
these two expressions interchangeably - is "conventional" because it is the financial and banking order that today dominates
the world scene. This dominance is a result of, first, the colonial
and military encroachment on the remainder of the world by
Western European and, later, American powers, and, second,
the late twentieth century occurrence of globalization. Though
the assumptions of conventional finance relating to man and nature differ from those of any other financial system with which it
came into contact, in practice the dominated have had little success in countering those assumptions. The march toward global
financial integration - replacing culturally distinct, organic systems with the modern system - has not sidestepped the Islamic
world, and the latter decades of the twentieth century have seen
in the very heart of the Islamic world the emergence of Westernstyle financial institutions which participate carte blanche in the
modern financial complex.
does not comport with the elements of a murabahah as practiced in contemporary Islamic finance.
17. See ABDULLAH SAEED, ISLAMIC BANKING AND INTEREST: A STUDY OF THE PROHIBITION OF RIBA AND ITS CONTEMPORARY INTERPRETATION 77-78 (1996) (noting that "Islamic
banks in general have been using murabahah as their major method of financing, constituting approximately seventy-five percent of their assets"); accord Humayon A. Dar &
John R. Presley, Lack of Profit Loss Sharing in Islamic Banking. Management and Control
Imbalances, 2 INT'LJ. OF ISLAMIC FIN. SERVICES 1, 1 (July-Sept. 2000), available at http://
islamic-finance.net/journals/ (stating that "[A]lmost all theoretical models of Islamic
banking are either based on Mudaraba[h] or Musharaka[h] or both .... Nearly all
Islamic banks, investment companies, and investment funds offer trade and project finance on mark-up, commissioned manufacturing, or on leasing bases").
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Nevertheless, Muslims did not wish to completely reject the
native elements of Islamic civilization and it did not take long for
Muslims to develop financial practices purporting to be at once
compliant with Islamic law and jurisprudence and workable
within the rubric of conventional banking and finance. This immense task of taking fourteen centuries' worth of legal scholarship and conforming it within a brief span of time - barely two
decades - and with limited intellectual resources, to accord
with a system completely alien to it came about by contemporary
jurists massaging certain classical modes or forms of Islamic
transactions to arrive at what Professor M. A. El-Gamal has referred to as the "closest permissible point," the unique tangency
between what contemporary jurists view as permissible under Islamic law and what conventional finance views, according to its
own terms, as efficient or optimal."8 It is because Islamic finance
has bowed to the norms of conventional finance that purveyors
of conventional finance see Islamic finance as no more than a
niche within the modern financial complex, where, for them,
marginal revenues are waiting to be made. Seen from this point
of view, the question whether there is more to Islamic finance
than the foregoing need not be asked.
B. Islamic Finance within the Context of Islam
A great deal of confusion will be allayed if it is acknowledged at the outset that in Western discussions of Islam, the
term is used interchangeably to denote both the religion [din]
of Islam"9 and the civilization of Islam. z °
18. See Mahmoud A. EI-Gamal, The Economics of 21st Century Islamic Jurisprudence, Speech at the Fourth Harvard University Forum on International Finance (Oct.
2000), at http://www.ruf.rice.edu/-elgamal/files/islamic.html.
19. As a religion,
Islam is the meeting between God as such and man as such. God as such: that
is to say God envisaged, not as He manifested Himself in a particular way at a
particular time, but independently of history and inasmuch as He is what He is
and also as He creates and reveals His nature. Man as such: that is to say man
envisaged, not as a fallen being needing a miracle to save him, but as man, a
theomorphic being endowed with an intelligence capable of conceiving of the
Absolute and with a will capable of choosing what leads to the Absolute.
FRITHIOF SCHUON, UNDERSTANDING ISLAM 1 (1994).
Professor Nasr, discussing the religion of Islam states:
At the heart of Islam stands the reality of God, the One, the Absolute and the
Infinite, the Infinitely Good and All-Merciful, the One Who is at once transcendent and immanent, greater than all we can conceive or imagine, yet, as
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One cannot speak of Islamic finance without speaking first
of Islamic law and jurisprudence. This is because Islam countenances living every aspect of one's life in accordance with norms
laid down by God.2 ' As a comprehensive view of life both in
relation to this world and the Hereafter, 2 2 Islam integrates mate-

rial and spiritual aspects of human beings in accordance with
Divine principles. The Shari'ah 23 - frequently translated as "Islamic law" or "Divine Law" - constitutes a web of beliefs, values,
and guidelines meant to establish and maintain human life in
this world in balance with the realities that exist beyond the tem-

poral order. 24 The injunctions of the Shari'ah are permanent,
the Qur'an, the sacred scripture of Islam, attests, closer to us than our jugular
vein.
NASR, supra note 9, at 3.
In this Article, when the religion [din] of Islam is meant, the term "Islam" alone is
used. When the civilization of Islam, the world of Islam or the human community of
Islam is meant, the expression "Islamic world" or "Islamic civilization" is used. The
adjective "Islamic" connotes something relating to either the religion or the world of
Islam. The term "Muslim" is a noun that refers to an individual follower of Islam, and
when used as an adjective, "Muslim" refers to something pertaining to the followers of
Islam, not to the religion or world of Islam.
20. As a civilization or human community, "[t]he vast world of Islam is actually like
a Persian medallion carpet; it has incredible diversity and complexity, yet it is dominated by a unity into which all the complex geometric and arabesque patterns are integrated." NASR, supra note 9, at 57. For more information about the perspectives within
Islamic civilization, see SEWYED HOSSEIN NASR, SCIENCE AND CIVILIZATION IN ISLAM 29-40
(1968).
21. For a general introduction to Islam, see ROGER DuPASQUIER, UNVEILING ISLAMI
(T.J. Winter trans., 1992); SUZANNE HANEEF, WHAT EVERYONE SHOULD KNOW ABOUT IsLAM AND MUSLIMS (1979); SCHUON, supra note 19; NASR, supra note 9.
22. For a discussion of the concept of the "Hereafter," see generally ABU HAMID ALGHAZALI, THE REMEMBRANCE OF DEATH AND THE AFTERLIFE (T.J. Winter trans., 1989).
23. Literally, the word "Shari'ah" means "the road to the watering place or path
leading to the water, i.e., the way to the source of life." Irshad Abdal-Haqq, Islamic Law:
An Overview of its Origin and Elements, 1J. ISLAMIC L. 1, 2 (1996). "The Shari'ah itself is a
vast network of injunctions and regulations which relate the world of multiplicity inwardly to a single Center which conversely is reflected in the multiplicity of the circumference." SEYYED HOSSEIN NASR, SUFI ESSAYS 43 (1999).
24. The terms "Islamic law" and "Shari'ah" are frequently used interchangeably in
Western scholarship. It is an oversimplification, however, to equate the Shari'ah with
law. The Shari'ah - which we have deliberately chosen not to translate in this Article
- may be said to contain law, but one must also recognize that it embraces elements
and aspects that are not, strictly speaking, law because they are beyond our conventional understanding of law. See BERNARD WEISS, THE SEARCH FOR GOD'S LAw: ISLAMIC
JURISPRUDENCE IN THE WRITING OF SAYF AL-DIN AL-AMIDI 1 (1992).
One of the most difficult aspects of Islam for modern people to understand is the
philosophy of law which reinforces the metaphysical basis for the Shari'ah in Islam. If
modern people in the West were able to grasp what the Old Testament says about the
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and the principles inherent in the Shari'ah can and ought to be
applied to new circumstances - such as Islamic finance in the
present day - as they arise.
The primary sources of the Shari'ah are the Qur'an 2' and
the Sunnah. 26 The detailed practical rules derived by reasoning
from the corpus of Shari'ah are known as fiqh. 7 Whereas the
Shari'ah includes moral laws and the general framework for restatus of law or how traditional Jews in the present day comprehend and practice Talmudic Law, it would make it easier to grasp the philosophy of law in Islam. Indeed the
Shari'ah and the Halakhah hold very similar positions in Islam and Judaism, respectively. NASR, supra note 9, at 117-18.
The Semitic conception, shared by both Judaism and Islam, sees law as the
embodiment of the Divine Will, as a transcendent reality which is eternal and
immutable, as a model by which the perfections and shortcomings of human
society and the conduct of the individual are judged, as the guide through
which man gains salvation and by rejecting it, courts damnation and destruction.
SEYYED HOSSEIN NASa, ISLAMIC LIFE AND THOUGHT 25 (1981).
25. See NASR, supra note 9, at 120. "The great theophany of Islam is the Qur'an; it
presents itself as a 'discernment' (furqan) between truth and error." SCHUON, supra
note 19, at 39. For Muslims, the Qur'an is the "the book containing the speech of God
revealed to the Prophet Muhammad," peace be upon him. KAMALI, supra note 9, at 14.
The phrase "peace be upon him" is customarily said and written after mention is
made of the Prophet Muhammad as well as all the other prophets, peace be upon them
all. See ABu HAMID AL-GHAZALI, INNER DIMENSIONS OF ISLAMIC WORSHIP 129-32 (Muhtar
Holland trans., n.d.).
The Qur'an contains approximately five hundred specific legal injunctions; for the
most part, the Qur'an sets general guiding principles. See Abdal-Haqq, supra note 23, at
21; see AHMAD HASAN, THE EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF ISLAMICJURISPRUDENCE 44-45 (4th ed.
1988). For a concise primer in English to the sciences of the Qur'an, see generally
AHMAD VON DENFFER, 'ULUM AL QUR'AN:

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SCIENCES OF THE

(1989). For a brief introduction in English to the discipline of Qur'anic exegesis, see generally IBN TAYMIYYA, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF TAFSEER
(Muhammad 'Abdul Haq Ansari trans., 1993).
26. "The word 'Sunnab' [sic] literally means 'a clear path or a beaten track,' 'a
normative tradition,' 'habitual practice,' 'customary procedure or action,' 'or an established course of conduct."' MICHAEL MUMISA, ISLAMIC LAW: THEORY AND INTERPRETATION 55 (2002). "In its juristic usage, Sunnah refers to the normative practice set up by
the Prophet of Islam as a model; his sayings, doings, and tacit approvals which were
later established as legally binding precedents in addition to the law established by the
Qur'an." Id. at 56.
27. "Fiqh, according to traditional authorities, is knowledge of the practical regulations and rules of the Shai'ah acquired by reference to and detailed study of the
sources." NASa, supra note 9, at 123. See ERIC WINKEL, ISLAM AND THE LIVING LAw: THE
IBN AL-ARABI APPROACH 15 (1997) (positing thatfiqh is the application of the Shari'ah
to different times and places based on the deeply and vigorously debated rules and
methodologies of usul al-fiqh).
The term fiqh is simply translated hereinafter and referred to throughout this Article as "Islamic law."
QUR'AN
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ligious life in Islam, fiqh refers to the result of the human activity
of exploration, interpretation, analysis, and presentation of the
textual sources of the Shari'ah, whether this takes places in writing, in schools, in the mind, or in formal opinion-giving.
Usul al-flqh, literally the "roots of Islamic law," constitutes
the science of deriving the detailed rules of Islamic law from
their sources. In other words, usul al-flqh, whether translated as
"roots of Islamic law" or simply as "Islamic jurisprudence,"2 8
comprises methods of reasoning and rules of interpreting which
are applied to the texts of the Qur'an and Sunnah in order to
deduce Islamic law. In comparison, Islamic law comprises the
practical rules of the Shari'ah derived from detailed evidence in
the textual sources, and is thus the end product of Islamic jurisprudence [usul al-fiqh]. Islamic law [ftqh] and Islamic jurisprudence [usul al-fiqh] are -two entirely distinct disciplines.2 9

The goals and objectives of the Shari'ah are known in
Arabic as maqasid al-Shari'ah.3 ° Securing benefit and preventing
harm in this life and in connection with the Hereafter are the

most important considerations [maslahah] of Islamic law. " In
order to prevent arbitrary or illogical results, jurists developed
an elaborate and varied 3 2 set of conditions and procedures
28. See

supra note 9, at 1. Cf SHERMAN A. JACKSON, ISLAMIC LAW AND THE
OF SHIHAB AL-DIN AL-QARAFI 121 (1996)
(translating the Arabic expression usul al-fiqh as "Islamic theoretical jurisprudence").
Usul al-fiqh has also been translated as "sources of legal discourse." See WINKEL, supra
note 27, at 35.
29. See KAMALI, supra note 9, at 1. The exhaustion of one's mental capacity in the
attempt to gain probable knowledge about anything concerning the Shari'ah may be
understood as the process of ijtihad, which must only be conducted by one properly
qualified to do so. See Sherman Jackson, Taqlid, Legal Scaffolding and the Scope of Legal
Injunctions in Post Formative Theory: Mutlaq and 'Ammin the Jurisprudenceof Shihab al-Din
al-Qarafi, 3 IsLAMic L. SOCIETY 165, 167 n.5 (1996) (quoting SAW AL-DIN AL-AMIDI, ALIHKAM F1 USUL AL-AHKAM (1968)). Professor Jackson offers his own definition of ijtihad
as "the interpretation of scripture directly with no intermediate authorities standing
between the sources and the individual jurist." Id.; see also, KAMALI, supra note 9, at 36693 (discussing the rigorous conditions required to be a mujtahid, one who conducts
ijtihad).
30. See IMPAN AHSAN KHAN NYAZEE, THEORIES OF IsLAMIC LAW 237 (1994) (stating
also that, according to al-Shatibi (d. 1388 C.E.), the purposes of the law have been
inferred inductively from the texts).
31. See id. at 4244 (commenting that there is a lengthy and rich discourse surrounding the ultimate intent of the law and the Lawgiver). See also NASR, supra note 9,
at 121.
32. Varied because different thinkers arrived at different results depending upon
their methodology in conducting ijtihad. It would not be uncommon for mujtahids who
STATE:

THE

KAMALI,

CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE
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which need to be fulfilled in order to permit reliance upon maslahahwhen arriving at a particular ruling.3 3 In order for any rule
of Islamic law to be valid and applicable it must not violate the
ultimate intent and purpose of the Shari'ah.3 4
In addition to maslahah and maqasid al-Shari'ah,there exists
the technical concept of ratiocination [ta'lil]3" in Islamic jurisprudence which is a tool of legal reasoning employable when
deriving Islamic law. Ta'lil literally means "causation" or "search
for the causes" and refers to the rational3 6 relationship between
cause and effect. Although this is what ta'lil literally means, jurists have tended to use the term in the context of the ratio of
the law, in other words, its operative value in causing a rule of
law to spring into effect.3 "
When the discourse turns to the goals, objectives and value
of the law, invariably one must also open the door to a discussion
of letter and spirit, or form and substance. Every religion has a
form and a substance, and Islam is no different in this regard. 8
Islamic jurisprudence provides methodological tools to investiused the same methodological approach - students of the same school of Islamic jurisprudence - to arrive at conclusions at odds with one another.
33. See KAMALI, supra note 9, at 273-75 (listing several important conditions for the
use of maslahah). Mostjurists classify maslahah into three categories each of which must
be protected: (1) the daruriyyat [essentials], (2) the hajiyyat [complements], and (3)
tahsiniyyat [embellishments]. See id. at 271. The daruriyyat consist of five essential interests: the preservation of din [religion], nafs [life], 'aql [intellect], nasl [progeny], and
mal [property]. The hajiyyat are those interests, the disregard of which result in hardship but not in the destruction or ruin of the community. See NYAZEE, supra note 30, at
214. Lastly, the tahsiniyyat are those interests "whose realisation leads to improvement
and the attainment of that which is desirable." KAMALI, supra note 9, at 272. An example of such is cleanliness in personal appearance. See id. Every Islamic ruling aims at
one of these three categories of objectives of the law.
34. See NYAZEE, supra note 30, at 222-23, 242.
35. For more information regarding the science of ratiocination [ta'lil] in Islamic
jurisprudence, see MUHAMMAD MUSTAFA SHALABI, TA'LIL AL-AHKAM (1981) (in Arabic).
36. We use the descriptor "rational" because Islamic jurisprudence views relationships of cause and effect to be, other than rational, both supra-rational and infra-rational. Supra-rational when the relationship is above and beyond the domain of the
rational faculty and knowable only in God's wisdom. Infra-rational when the relationship has a sentimental, emotional, or other irrational basis.
37. Moreover, it must be borne in mind that the authority of the Qur'an as the
chief source of Shari'ah is fundamentally independent of ratiocination. Muslims are
supposed to accept the plain injunctions of the Qur'an - there are very few of them so
plainly stated - irrespective of whether such injunctions can be rationally explicated.
See K-AMALI, supra note 9, at 35.
38. See FRITHJOF SCHUON, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN THE RELIGIONS 14 (2002) (stating "Islam spread like lightning by virtue of its substance").
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gate and distinguish between the letter and rationale of Islamic
law. Beside ta'lil, one key method, among others, of dealing with
the substance or spirit of Islamic law centers on the concept of
hikmah. The hikmah of a rule of law is that law's ultimate objective as known in the Lawgiver's (i.e., God's) wisdom. 9
It is easier to understand hikmah by contrasting it to its
counterpart 'illah, which is a term that shares a common linguistic derivation from the term ta'lil. "Ilah(plural 'ilal) may be understood as the formal or effective cause, legally speaking, for
the activation of a rule of Islamic law.4 ° In practice, should a
jurist wish to extend an existing rule of law, the jurist must establish a common 'illah between the original case and the new case.
If implemented correctly, the 'illah causes the application of an
existing ruling to a new situation, thereby creating new law, in
order to establish, preserve, or protect a predetermined purpose
of the law.4 1 Functionally speaking, the 'illah need not even look
at the purpose of the rule of Islamic law, which, strictly speaking,
lies in the province of hikmah. Nevertheless, the establishment,
preservation or protection of a predetermined purpose of Islamic law follows the proper application of 'illah.
The textual sources of the Shari'ah can explicitly state the
'illah just as they can the hikmah. Unlike the hikmah, the 'illah
can be identified by jurists through ijtihad, as well as through
logical or speculative reasoning.4 2 Generally speaking, hikmah is
not subject to rational inference, although jurists can apply it
analogically if it is expressly set forth in the textual sources of the
Shari'ah. If it is not expressed in the Qur'an or Sunnah, the
hikmah of any given rule of law may still at times be the subject of
jurist's reasoning and, if it is, the probable hikmah - probable
rather than certain because the jurist reasoned it rather than discovered it plainly stated in the text - may be used substantively
as an adduced source of general principles in expounding Islamic law. Islamic law and jurisprudence enjoy a greater treasury
of technical methods and procedures than what we have space to
39. See KAMALI, supra note 9, at 35.
40. See Umar F. Moghul, Approximating Certainty in Ratiocination: How to Ascertain
the 'Illah (Effective Cause) in the Islamic Legal System and How to Determine the Ratio Decidendi
in the Anglo-American Common Law, 4J. ISLAMIC L. 125 (1999).
41. See N'AZEE, supra note 30, at 208.
42. See

KAMALI,

supra note 9, at 35.
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mention here,4" but for now, the foregoing exposition is sufficient to give the reader a taste of how Islamic law countenances
law, its philosophy, its letter, and its spirit.
C. Two Categories of Islamic Law
The Shari'ah has given rise to two bodies or categories of
Islamic law which: (1) pertain to worship ['ibadat], and (2) govern human interactions and transactions [mu'amalat] which includes those areas that Anglo-American law would describe as
contracts, torts, property law, and criminal law. This dual categorization mirrors the dual nature of humans as beings having,
in the same instance, a temporal aspect and an aspect beyond
time and space. Generally speaking, different rules govern the
derivation and application of law in 'ibadatand mu'amalat." Jurists acknowledge that although the sources of Islamic law are
divine, their derivation and application must be a construct of
the human intellect. This is reflected in the epistemology of the
legal reasoning that the jurists constructed.4 5
43. For a more detailed exposition of Islamic law and jurisprudence than what can
be provided within the limited confines of this Article, see generally KAMALI, supra note
9; MUMISA, supra note 26; NASR, supra note 9, at 113-56.
44. For example, according to the overwhelming majority of Islamic jurists, matters that fall within the realm of mu'amalat,such as financial transactions, are presumptively permissible under the Shari'ah unless determined otherwise by jurists. See MoHAMMAD HASHIM KAMALI, ISLAMIC COMMERCIAL LAw: AN ANALYSIS OF FUTURES AND OPTIONs 66-83 (2000). It should be noted, unsurprisingly, that the minority position holds
that actions within the realm of mu'amalat are presumed impermissible under the
Shari'ah unless Islamic law expressly permits them.
Thus, given the majority's presumption of permissibility, a misunderstanding
looms when one opens a contemporary treatise on Islamic finance and reads a list of
contracts and transaction forms which are claimed by the jurist as representing an exhaustive list of those forms acceptable under Islamic law. See, e.g., MUHAMMAD TAQI
USMANI, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC FINANCE (1999). The implication is that these
dozen or so contracts and transaction forms constitute the sum total of what Islam offers or are all somehow per se divinely ordained. Consequently, many contemporaries
assert - not verbally but rather through their hermeneutics and legal method - that
for a transaction to be Islamic, it must fit within one of these preconceived contracts or
combinations thereof. In undertaking this exercise, one often finds that the transaction results in something not entirely intended by the parties and or one that does not
accord optimally with the Shari'ah and is, at the same time, somewhat of an oddity
under local law. Yet Muslim jurists living in centuries past regularly commented that
the enumerated forms of trading and transacting are not the only modes or forms permissible under Islamic law. It is very interesting to note that upon even a superficial
study of the enumerated contract forms, one finds jurists historically permitted many of
the contract forms as exceptions to various legal maxims and principles.
45. See, e.g., A. Kevin Reinhart, When Women Went to Mosques: al-Aydini on the Dura-
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The principles and rules with respect to the 'ibadatare constant and immutable and thus consistent with the spiritual nature of the human, which exists in this life and shall exist in the
eternal life of the Hereafter.4 6 The 'lal of acts of 'ibadatare generally imperceptible to the human intellect, although the intellect may be able to intuit the higher purpose and value in the
various acts of worship.4 7 The 'ilal of the mu'amalat, on the
other hand, are discernible to the human intellect.4" Thus, the
guidelines pertaining to 'ibadat are understood by jurists to be
beyond reasoning whereas the guidelines pertaining to
mu'amalatare subject to reasoning.4 9 It suffices to say that, generally speaking, the legal rules of the 'ibadat cannot necessarily
be rationalized in the same manner as can those of the
mu'amalat.5 ° In contrast to the 'ibadat,the mu'amalatconstitute a
mutable and dynamic body of law, pliable within the bounds of
the Shari'ah to the existential and material realities of human
life in this world. The 'ilalof the mu'amalat are knowable by the
rational faculty. In this way, human beings subject them to rational thought and juristic reasoning.5"
One may take a functional approach in describing Islamic
finance today, and observe that Islamic finance provides conventional financial services on a basis that complies with Islamic law
and Islamic jurisprudence. Islamic financial instruments and
transactions must, according to prevailing opinion in the industry," take the form of one of the classically prescribed contracts.
tion of Assessments, in

Isi-Alic LEGAL INTERPRETATION:

MuFris AND THEIR FATWAS

116

(Khalid Mas'ud et al. eds., 1996).
46. See Moghul, supra note 40, at 141-42.
47. Id. Islamic scholarship observes the difference between intellectus or nous, on
the one hand, and ratio or reason, on the other. Muslim sages throughout the ages
such as Abu Hamid al-Ghazzali and Jalal al-Din Rumi cautioned against the negative
aspect of the rational faculty as a veil and limitation impeding one's ability to reach the
divine verities. See NASR, supra note 23, at 52-56.
It should be noted that in the context of the 'ibadat, the term sabab is often used
instead of 'illah to refer to the effective cause, or perhaps more precisely the effective
condition of a rule of law. See NYAZEE, supra note 30, at 67 n. 13; see also KAMAU, supra
note 9, at 211.
48. Moghul, supra note 40, at 142.
49. See 'ABD AL-KARIM ZAYDAN, AL-WAJIZ FI USUL AL-FIQH 57-58 (1967) (in Arabic).
50. See e.g., AL-MIsRI, supra note 13, at 52-56 (discussing purities and impurities of
water in the context of ablution).
51. See e.g., ZAYDAN, supra note 49, at 57-58; ABu ZAHRAH, USUL AL-FIQH 57-59

(1950).
52. See generally Yusuf Talal DeLorenzo, The Religious Foundations of Islamic Finance,
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Jurists claim that the contracts commonly used in contemporary
Islamic finance are basically the same as those used for centuries
in the Islamic world, and for that reason, are acceptable to them
and to the Islamic finance industry as prima facie appropriate.
The desire for comportment of these contracts to the AngloAmerican system of law - sometimes the comportment is
forced, sometimes it is contrived - is a new phenomenon, the
significance of which has not yet gripped either the Islamic finance world or the broader Islamic community. This Article
posits that a disconnect is being propagated between, on the one
hand, the spirit, wisdom and ultimate goals of the Shari'ah and,
on the other, the form in which Islamic finance is packaging its
products and services. This disconnect has reached a level of
significance such that not only does Islamic financial literature
recognize it, "3 but with the opinion handed down in Symphony
Gems, so does a Western court of law.
D. ContractualForms and Limitations within Islamic Law
This Article now focuses on a technical description of contractual forms in Islamic law.
1. Contract Forms
The Shari'ah seeks to ensure propriety and fairness and to
protect the integrity of mutual assent and the rights of contracting parties. In general terms and given the presumption of
permissibility,5 4 the Shari'ah entitles parties to stipulate the
terms and conditions of their agreement so long as they do not
violate the Shari'ah.
Contract formation5 5 in Islamic law begins with certain
human behavior or conduct [tasarru], whereby persons create
or agree upon a contractual right.56 Jurists, in discussing the
in ISLAMIC FINANCE: INNOVATION AND GRoWTH 9-28 (Simon Archer & Rifaat Ahmed
Abdel Karim eds., 2002).
53. See, e.g., El-Gamal, supra note 18.
54. See supra note 43 (citing sources for which to refer for a more detailed exposition of Islamic law and jurisprudence).

55. For a historical discussion of sales and contracts, see

'ABDULLAH

'ALwI

HAI

(1997).
56. According to Islamic law, the Lawgiver, that is, God, has made a demand on
human beings in five categories, thus, human conduct can be categorized into legal
injunctions [ahkam] and assessed values by Islamic law. The five assessments are as
follows: (1) Wajib or Fard [obligatory], (2) Haram [forbidden or prohibited],
HASSAN, SALES AND CONTRACTS IN EARLY ISLAMIC COMMERCIAL LAw
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classifications of tasarrufwhich do and do not lead to a contract,
focus upon
the volitive will to create or modify a right or respon57
sibility.
The Islamic legal definition of a contract places fundamental importance in the will or intent of each party. Some scholars
define a contract as an agreement between two willing parties to
establish, shift, or terminate a right.5 8 Another way of looking at
a contract under Islamic law is as "the connection of an offer
with an acceptance in a lawful fashion, the effect of which occurs
definitely upon the object of the agreement."5 9 A contract is
thus formed at the time agreed upon by the parties by their mutual assent and not at the time it is memorialized in the form of a
written agreement. A contract need not be written to be valid,
although in certain cases, given the nature and subject matter of
the contract, a written instrument may be required.
According to Islamic law, a contract must be externally expressed in words, via speech or otherwise. Writing is a mode of
expressing the contract that, according to jurists, constitutes an
admission [iqrar] of the fact that the contracting parties have
already agreed. A contract, whether in writing or in other forms,
requires the clear and precise expression [jala al-ma'na] of the
will of both the offeror and the offeree.6 " Consequently, the
written document itself neither creates nor modifies contractual
rights or responsibilities, nor does it constitute the required offer and acceptance, but merely expresses such.
The majority of jurists have held that there are four 6 arkan
(singular rukn), or required or necessary elements, to a sales
(3) Mandub [recommended], (4) Makruh [frowned upon or abominable], and (5)
Mubah or Halal [permissible]. See generally AHMAD HASAN, PRINCIPLES OF ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE: THE COMMAND OF THE SHARI'AH AND JURIDICAL NORM (1993) (expounding
upon these categories in greater detail).
57. See, e.g., Umar F. Moghul, Contract Formation by Paper Clipping, THE ISLAMIC
BANKER, Oct. 2001.
58. In Arabic: ittifaq iradatayn ala insha'i haqq aw ala naqlihi aw ala intiha'ihi.
59. In Arabic: 'irtibaatijab bi qabul ala wajh mashru' yathbutu atharahufi mahalihi'.
60. To do so, it is often suggested that the past or present tense (rather than the
future or imperative, for instance) be employed when contracting to ensure definitiveness and clarity.
61. Some jurists hold that there are three, combining the seller and buyer into a
single rukn. See WAHBA AL-ZUHAYLI, FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS IN ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE:
A TRANSLATION OF VOL. 5 OF AL-FIQH AL-ISLAMI WA ADILLATUHU 8-9 (Mahmoud ElGamal trans., 2003).
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contract.6 2 A rukn is that which is inherent or internal [juz min
haqiqah] to the contract and which, if left absent or unfulfilled,
renders the contract invalid such that all legal consequences of
the contract (or action) do not follow. 63 For example, as generally accepted among jurists, the arkan of a sales contract are: "(1)
a seller; (2) a buyer; (3) an object of the contract (both what is
priced and the price itself); and (4) the expression of the contract (namely, manifestation of mutual assent in the form of offer and acceptance)." 6 4 In order to be valid and enforceable, a
contract must first fulfill its arkan. For instance, if either an offer
or acceptance is absent, the contract is invalid (meaning both
batil and fasid, according to the majority position among the
four Sunni schools of law, or merely batil, according to the
Hanafis, one of the four Sunni schools of Islamic jurisprudence) .65
A contract must, in addition, fulfill certain conditions
[shurut, singular shart] to its validity. A shart is similar to a rukn
in that it must be present for the contract to be valid. The similarity, however, ends there because unlike a rukn, a shart is external to [kharij an haqiqah] the contract.6 6 Although jurists differ
on the finer details, the conditions [shurut] to validity for a sales
contract may be summarized as follows:
1. Adulthood,
sanity and discernment of the contracting
67
parties;
2. Correlation between the offer and acceptance;6
3. Unity of contract session such that convention would not
indicate a rejection of the offer;6 9
4. The object of sale is itself saleable property70 and either
62. Id. at 8-9. The following discussion of arkan and shurut is limited to mu'arnalat
and does not cover 'ibadat.
63. ZAYDAN, supra note 49, at 59.
64. ZUHAYLI, supra note 61, at 8-9.
65. ZAYDAN, supra note 49, at 65-67.
66. See id. at 59.
67. Jurists typically require a person be adult, sane, and discerning to contract, but
there are exceptions to this rule which lie outside the scope of this Article. Adulthood
is generally defined as the onset of puberty, and discernment is the ability to competently handle one's financial affairs. See ZuiA-vu, supra note 61, at 351-58; ZAYDAN,
supra note 49, at 91-144. See also KUTAIBA S. CHALEBY, FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY IN ISLAMIC
JURISPRUDENCE 20-22, 37-53 (2001).
68. ZUHAYLI, supra note 61, at 19.
69. See id. at 19-26.
70. For a thing to be saleable, it must be lawful under the Shari'ah. Pork, for
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owned or in the possession of the seller
and available and
71
deliverable at the time of contract;
72
The object of sale is known and sufficiently described;
and
The price
is specified and known at the time of con3
tract.

7

According to the majority position among the jurists of Islamic law, if any one of the above-listed shurut is absent or unfulfilled, the sale, act, or contract is invalid [batil].7 ' However,
Hanafijurists opine that the absence of certain shurut render the
contract fasid, meaning that certain but not all legal consequences may still follow from the contract. 75 Moreover, the missing shart can be supplied at any subsequent time. Once the
arkan and shurut are all present for a particular transaction or
contract, and if no legal impediments [mawanil, such as coercion, are present, the contract, then, is valid [sahih].
2. Riba
Perhaps the most well-known principle of Islamic finance is
the prohibition of fiba, which in its most common contemporary
understanding, is said to include interest on a loan.76 Jurists
77
have almost unanimously forbidden commercial bank interest.
One reason advanced for this is that the Shari'ah countenances
lending money as a charitable activity and not necessarily a
profit making venture. The prohibition of riba also applies to
currency lending transactions and to trading that involves certain other commodities, such as certain foodstuffs, gold and silexample, would not constitute a valid sale object for Muslims. See VOGEL & HAYES, supra
note 4, at 94-95.
71. See ZUHANIL, supra note 61, at 15-16; see also KAMALI, supra note 44, at 99-116
(2000) (discussing in detail the discourse regarding, and rationale underlying, these
concerns).
72. See ZUHAYLI, supra note 61, at 36-48.
73. See id.
74. ZAYDAN, supra note 49, at 66.
75. See id.
76. Cf ZUHAYLI, supra note 61, at 338. For an instructive essay on why not all interest constitutes the forbidden riba and why not all riba is interest, see Mabmoud A. ElGamal, An Economic Explication of the Prohibition of Riba in Classical Islamic Jurisprudence
(May 2, 2001), at http://www.ruf.rice.edu/-egamal/files/islamic.html.
77. ZUHAYLI, supra note 61, at 339-52 (presenting and refuting the arguments of
those who contend that banking interest should be permitted).
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ver. 71 When these commodities are traded, the trades must be
79
made in equal measure and without deferment.
The prohibition against interest-based lending has not
stopped contemporary Islamic finance from, in practice, formalistically finding ways around this prohibition. In practice, the
economics of principal and interest have become couched in a
contrived set of technical legal terms of art. This formalistic
translation of interest-based lending into Islamic finance has not
been accompanied by any practical effort that approaches, let
alone overcomes, the substantive problems wrought thereby on
the integrity of Islamic law and jurisprudence. It has caused interminable chaos vis-d-vis attempts to create an Islamic economy.
The notion of prepayment serves as a specific example of the
formalistic acceptance of practices that, arguably, are substantively forbidden by Islamic law.
Prepayments resulting in a reduction of the principal
amount "owed" by "borrowers" are typically not allowed under
Islamic law and Shari'ah committees of most Islamic banks have
chosen to abide, at least nominally, by this overt prohibition. 0
These same Shari'ah committees have gone on to permit prepayments when they are couched in the language of "rebate" in
spite of the fact that the end result is one and the same whether
it is called a prepayment or a rebate."' In this and similar examples, the question that remains unaddressed is whether it is the
form or substance of a prepayment which Islamic law views as
problematic. The idea of an advance purchase, which is similar
to the notion of a prepayment, has also been approved by certain Shari'ah committees in the context of murabahah- and
musharakah-based transactions.8 2 It is, moreover, prohibited
78. See IMRAN AHSAN KHAN NYAZEE, THE CONCEPT OF RiA AND ISLAMIC BANKING 67

(1995). See also id. at 67-77 (discussing the 'ilal of iba). For a discussion of the extension of the prohibition of iba to modern currency, see id. at 79-93. See also ZtuHAYLI,
supra note 61, at 315-28.

See generally IQBAL AHMAD KHAN SUHAIL, WHAT IS RIBA?

(Rizwanullah & Zafarul-Islam Khan trans., Pharos Media & Publ'g Pvt. Ltd. 1999)
(1936).
79. ZUHAYLI, supra note 61, at 311-14 (explaining the types of riba).
80. See USMANI, supra note 44, at 141-43. Those permitting as a general rule prepayments with a reduction in the debt owed rely on a hadith text the authority and
authenticity of which is disputed. See id. at 142.
81. According to Zuhayli, 'jurists agree that a debtor making a smaller prepayment
inlieu of a larger debt that had not yet matured is permissible by 'mutual consent' [that
takes place] ex-post." ZUHAYLI, supra note 61, at 328.
82. Instances of both have occurred in the United States with certain Islamic home
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under Islamic law for a borrower to be charged any late fees;8 3
some contemporary jurists have, however, allowed late charges
to the extent the lender argues it has actually incurred costs due
to the payment being late.84 Similarly, when a party defaults on
its obligations, the defaulting party may be required to donate a
5
specified amount to charity in lieu of paying penalties.1
As can be expected, there exist many other complexities
and subtleties to the subject of Yiba, and those topics are beyond
the scope of this Article. What is important to understand,
though, is that the manifold rules of Islamic transactional law
had traditionally been arrived at during premodern times
through the methods of usul al-fiqh in such a way as to ensure
that the fundamental principles prohibiting the practices of iba
9
and ghara7
were upheld. Now that conventional finance has
made a norm of these practices, Islamic finance has in effect assumed them without analyzing their substantive validity, and is
finding ways formalistically to integrate these erstwhile forbidden practices into the fold of Islamic law.
3. Gharar
Another key feature of Islamic finance is the prohibition of
gharar,a term which has been translated as "trading in risk"8 7 or

"risk-taking" 8 and has been taken by jurists to refer to a lack of
specificity in the terms of a financial contract. Ghararmay be
best understood as ignorance of the material attributes of a
transaction, such as the availability or existence of the subject
financing and refinancing structures. Interestingly, absent such a feature, the financing
party may have run afoul of local usury laws. In such cases, Shari'ah committees have
permitted the otherwise prohibited, under the laws of necessity, in order to comply with
these local laws rather than using the rationale of alleviating the hardship (a purpose of
Islamic law) that would result to homeowners absent such a prepayment feature.
83. See, e.g., QUR'AN 2:280 (stating "[a]nd if [the debtor] is in straitened circumstances, let there be postponement until [he is] in ease").
84. USMANI, supra note 44, at 131-40. In representing various institutions, we have
seen prepayments permitted in certain circumstances, such as home financing transactions.
85. Id. at 102.
86. See infra Part I.D.3.
87. See Mahmoud A. El-Gamal, An Economic Explication of the Prohibition of Ghararin
Classical IslamicJurisprudence,at I (May 2, 2001), at http://www.ruf.rice.edu/-elgamal/
files/islamic.html.
88. See KAtALI, supra note 44, at 84 (suggesting that the "basic concern in all discussions of ghararis with elements of risk-taking"); see also id. at 84-98.
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matter, its qualities, quantity, deliverability, and the amount,
terms, and timing of payment."9 For gharar to have legal consequences: (1) such ghararmust be excessive and not trivial; (2) it
must pertain to the subject matter of the sale; and (3) society
must not be in need of the contract in question. This last requirement explains why forward sale [salam] and manufacture
[istisna'] contracts have traditionally been permitted under Islamic law, despite the arguable presence of ghararin these contracts. ° Broadly speaking, the taint of ghararcan be prevented
when the parties to a contract have adequate knowledge of the
subject matter of the transaction and the counter-values they intend to exchange.9 1 Gharar may also be limited and controlled
through formal regulation. 2
Jurists have debated the presence of ghararin those sales in
which the object is not viewed before conclusion of the contract
or in which the object is nonexistent at the time of entry into the
contract. 3 Some jurists have held that the ghararin such cases is
89. See id. at 84.
90. Id. at 85. See e.g., ZuHjLI, supra note 61, at 385 (citing Ibn Rushd debunking
the position held by a small minority of Muslim jurists that prohibits leasing by arguing
the sale object's existence is extremely likely); see also id. at 238 (stating "the forward
sale [salam] contract was made an exception for the rule prohibiting the sale of nonexistent items. This is a special license given to the people to meet their economic
needs and facilitate their daily lives"); see also id. at 488 (stating the "permissibility of this
contract [silent partnership or mudarabah] is viewed as an exception to general rules
prohibiting excessive risk and uncertainty"); see also id. at 271 (stating that despite it
being a non-existent item, istisna' [the contract of manufacture] is permissible by reasoning of istihsan, or equitable preference). For further information regarding salam,
see id. at 237-66. For further information concerning istisna', see generally id. at 26780. For further information regarding istihsan, see ZAYDAN, supra note 49, at 230-35;
ABU ZAHRAH, supra note 51, at 262-72; SOBHI MAHMASSANI, FALSAFAT AL-TASHRI F ALIsLAM: THE PHILOSOPHY OF JURISPRUDENCE IN IsLAM 85-87 (Farhat J. Ziadeh trans.,
1961). Istihsan [equitable preference] is a proof in which a jurist gives preference to
one of many possible solutions to a problem in order to comply with the objective of
fairness in the Shari'ah. Istihsan differs from equity in Anglo-American law in that equity relies on the concept of natural law whereas istihsan relies on the ideas of fairness
and conscience in the Shari'ah. Which of these solutions should be selected and why,
as well as the degree of authority of istihsan, are among the considerations of usul alfiqh. For a comparative analysis between istihsan and the doctrine of equity, see John
Makdisi, Legal Logic and Equity in Islamic Law, 32 Am.J. COMP. L. 63, 66-85 (1985). Unlike the doctrine of equity in Western law, which "derives its legitimacy from the belief
in a natural right or justice beyond positive law," istihsan is an integral aspect of Islamic
law and it does not seek or recognize a law above and superior from it. Id. at 67.
91. See KAMALI, supra note 44, at 86.
92. See id. at 160-61.
93. See id. at 90-93.
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excessive or exorbitant and others have held it to be minimal.9 4
Many hold that in certain cases the absence of the object is outweighed by other, more important considerations. Examples of
this abound in leasing [ijarah] and manufacturing orders [istisnal, in which the sale objects are nonexistent at the time of
the contract, but are still permitted by jurists to be the objects of
contracts because doing so is deemed to fulfill the needs of society.9 5 As a result of the difference in opinion among jurists as to
what constitutes the 'illah of this ruling, some jurists have opined
that the most important consideration in cases of nonexistent
sale objects is not their existence but their deliverability.9 6
The notion of delivery is closely allied in Islamic law to the
concept of possession [qabd], which a majority of jurists have
held to be a requirement for a valid sale.9" Jurists differ, however, on the definition of qabd. Many assert that it means actual,
while others hold it to mean constructive, possession."' And still
other jurists state that it is to be determined with reference to
prevailing mercantile custom 9 9 since it is undefined in the textual sources and depends on the nature of the item.' 0 0
E. Precis of Murabahah
1. Definition of Murabahah
Sales are, generally speaking, classified as either murabahah
or musawamah.'0 1 The primary distinction between the two
arises from the requirement in murabahah that the seller inform
the buyer of the seller's cost to obtain the item of sale and how
much profit he will earn on the sale, whereas in the case of
musawamah, no such disclosure is made." °2
Often the term murabahah is translated as "cost plus mark94. See id. at 90.
95. See id. at 85.
96. See id. at 117-24 (citing a number of jurists from various Sunni schools of Islamic jurisprudence).
97. See id.
98. See id. at 121.
99. Id. at 121. Custom or habit, whether mercantile or otherwise, can be considered valid from the point of view of the Shari'ah if such a custom or habit does not
contradict or contravene the Shari'ah. See NASR, supra note 9, at 121.
100. See KAMALI, supra note 44, at 120-21.
101. UsMANI, supra note 44, at 96.
102. See id.
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up sale." 3 The Maliki school of Islamic jurisprudence defines
the murabahah contract as one in which a "seller informs [a]
buyer of the cost at which the seller obtained an object of sale
[which is to be resold to such buyer] and collects a profit margin
either as a lump sum, or the seller may state the profit margin as
a percentage or ratio of the seller's original purchase price. "104
The Hanafis define it as the transfer of an object obtained
through a prior contract in exchange for the original price plus
a stated profit margin.10 5 The Shafi'is and Hanbalis define it as
the selling of a good at its original purchase price plus a profit,
provided, in addition, that both parties know the original
purchase price.10 6
Contemporary murabahah transactions may be described as
follows: a person (the buyer) requests a party (the seller) to
purchase an item so that the buyer can, in turn, purchase the
same item from the seller. Presumably, the buyer cannot afford
to pay in full on the spot and is unwilling to borrow conventionally. The seller informs the buyer of the price at which the seller
will obtain or has obtained the item (the "Principal Cost"), and
both parties agree upon a profit margin. Generally in contemporary Islamic financial transactions, the seller is a financial institution, and the sale by the
seller to the buyer occurs on a de10 7
ferred installment basis.
Justice Taqi Usmani, who sits on the Shari'ah committees of
many of the world's largest Islamic financial institutions, has remarked that the manner in which murabahahtransactions ought
normatively to be implemented varies significantly from the
manner in which Islamic finance implements them in the present day.1 ° Modern Islamic financial institutions have taken this
103. See supra note 15 (explaining further the term murabahah).
104. ZUHAYLI, supra note 61, at 353.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. A valid deferred sale [bay'mu'ajjal] does not entail riba (though it may involve
interest) because the countervalues exchanged must be of a different class (e.g., an
automobile and currency). The formal aspect of Islamic law does not dictate the economic criteria of how prices are to be determined. It should be noted that often Islamic banks use LIBOR or other similar references as benchmarks. See VOGEL & HAYES,
supra note 4, at 139; cf USMANI, supra note 44, at 119 (stating that "merely using the
interest rate as a benchmark for determining the profit of murabahah does not render
the transaction as invalid, haram or prohibited, because the deal itself does not contain
interest. The rate of interest has been used only as an indicator or as a benchmark").
108. See USMANI, supra note 44, at 104-05; see also VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 4, at
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form of sale and modified it formalistically in ways that tend to
blur the line as to its normative spirit. Despite this failing, the
saving grace of contemporary Islamic financial practice is that
the form, as commonly implemented today, is not without precedent in classical law and jurisprudence. °9
2. Boundaries of Acceptability
Though the majority ofjurists consider murabahah a permissible transaction, jurists of the Maliki school of Islamic jurisprudence find it relatively less desirable in comparison to other contracts of sale.11 ° Jurists permitting such transactions cite the
Qur'an as well as the rulings of other authorities." 1 According
to Zuhayli, the murabahah"satisfies all the legal requirements for
sale1 1 2 and . . . provides a valuable service in economic mar1 13
kets."

Present day jurists have divided contemporary murabahah
transactions into two promises. The first is a promise by the
seller to acquire an item, and the second is a promise by the
buyer to buy from the seller the same item. Contemporary jurists in Islamic finance have chosen to rely on the minority
Maliki position 1

4

that promises contained in the murabahah are

140 (commenting "[m]urabaha[h] is now commonly in use only in a composite form"
even though this form was known classically).
109. In a classical example, the scholar al-Shafi'i (d. 820) is quoted as having explained:
If an individual shows another a good and [referring to such good] says "Buy
this, and I will give you this much profit," and then the second man buys it,
then the purchase is valid. If the first man said, "I will give you this much
profit, but I retain an option [to keep or return the good]," then he may
conclude the sale or leave it.
ZUHAYLI, supra note 61, at 361.
110. See generally E1-Gamal, supra note 76. It is unclear from EI-Gamal's translation
whether the Malikis simply find it less favorable or actually deem the transaction
makruh.
111. Muslim scholars generally quote two verses of the Qur'an when discussing the
legality of murabahah: "And God has permitted trade" (2:275) and "But let there be
among you traffic and trade by mutual goodwill" (4:29). In buttressing the argument in
favor of murabahahusage, jurists also cite a report from Ibn Mas'ud, a contemporary of
the Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him, stating the murabahah's permissibility.
To understand the relevance that Islamic jurisprudence finds in such a report, see
KAMALI, supra note 9, at 235-44.
112. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. See also infia Part I.E.3.
113. ZUHAYT], supra note 61, at 354.
114. Observers of Islamic law may argue that in order to reach a desired legal
outcome, these jurists have deviated from the opinions of their schools of jurispru-
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binding [lazim] and not terminable at will, so long as the promisee has actually relied upon the promise."'
3. Conditions of Validity
As a sale, the murabahahcontract must minimally fulfill the
arkan and shurut normally associated with a sales contract."'
The murabahahcontract must also fulfill the following shurut particular to murabahah contracts:
1. The initial contract by which the seller purchases the
good must be valid. If this initial sale is, for instance, defective or invalid, the
subsequent sale to the buyer would
17
not be permitted."
2. The buyer must know the8 Principal Cost at which the
seller obtained the item." 1
3. The parties must have knowledge of, and specify at the
time of contract, the profit margin because it is a component of the price at which the good is sold to the
buyer.1 1 9
4. The Principal Cost for which the seller purchased the
good must be fungible. If the Principal Cost is non-fungible, and the seller does not own the item, the sale would
not be permitted since the object is not in the seller's possession and, therefore, its value is unknown. If the profit
margin is made dependent on the Principal Cost (such as
a percentage thereof), the sale would not be permitted
because, again, the value of the non-fungible good is unknown.' 2 ° If, however, the seller owns the item and purdence, thereby opening the door to methodological dissonance, among other things.
Often the legal method of Shari'ah committees consists of a need to opine on a certain
matter and to search for an opinion by any jurist no matter how obscure the opinion or
the jurist. Rather than discover or derive law from the sources of Shari'ah, Shari'ah
committees are often content, for various socio-historical reasons, to rely upon those
existing rulings with which they are methodologically incompatible or, at worst, with
which they personally disagree.
115. For his part, Zuhayli overcomes this criticism of methodological dissonance
by asserting that the synthesis [talfiq] of the Hanafi and Maliki rulings is permissible
because the two rulings pertain to two different issues. There is no harm, he contends,
in following one jurist on one issue and another on another issue. This ruling also
upholds "the stability of contractual obligations and [the] protection of the parties'
economic interests." ZUHAYLI, supra note 61, at 361.
116. See supra Part I.D.1.
117. ZuHAYLI, supra note 61, at 361.
118. See id. at 355.
119. See id.
120. See id.
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chased it by non-fungible means, the sale would be permitted so long as the profit margin has been clearly specified, is of another type of non-fungible good, and does
not depend on the Principal Cost (such as a percentage

thereof).
5.

121

When trading in goods, such as currency or certain foodstuffs, which are subject to the rules against riba, the validity of the murabahah requires that riba not have been present in the original sale. If fiba inhered, then the purchased goods may not be sold via murabahahbecause the
original sale would be itself invalid and the seller's profit
in the subsequent sale to buyer would also constitute niba
(or more specifically, riba al-fadl)122

To the foregoing list, contemporary jurists have attached additional shurut:
1.

2.

3.

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

The seller must own the object 1 23 and bear the risks and
responsibilities associated with ownership. The risks of
loss and damage must be borne by the seller during such
time as the good remains in his possession or ownership.' 24 Though this may seem obvious, it is explicitly
mentioned perhaps as a means of combating the loose
manner in which some murabahah sales have been conducted.
The seller must have actual or constructive possession of
the object of sale even if only for a short time.' 25 It is
quite likely that this is imposed because often in contemporary murabahah sales, the purchase by the seller occurs
merely on paper, in which case he bears no true risk with
regard to the good. It is also commonplace for ownership of the good to pass to the seller and immediately
back to the buyer during the course of a single transaction closing. Shari'ah committees have come to accept
this reality even though the infinitesimal holding period
by the seller challenges the integrity of the first sale as
independent of the second.
The good must have been purchased by the seller from a
third party (i.e. a party other than the buyer). For the
buyer to sell the item to the seller and then repurchase it
See id.
Id.
Id.
USMANI,

See id.

supra note 44, at 106.
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from the seller is deemed a legal dodge or contrivance
[hila, plural hiyal] 126 used to accomplish an otherwise forbidden interest-based [ribawi] financing. 127 Some jurists
argue that even a three-party murabahah constitutes a legal contrivance,' 28 though Shari'ah committees have generally allowed the buyer to act as agent of the seller.129 In
such cases, the two parties provide unilateral promises to
one another to sell and buy the commodity.' 30 The
buyer purchases the good on the seller's behalf thereby
acting as the trustee of the seller who is considered the
actual owner and bearer of responsibility for the good. 13'
32
The buyer then purchases the good from the seller.'
Readers are reminded that these transfers of ownership
between the parties actually take place simultaneously.
Given the brevity of such ownership, whether the seller
actually bears any risk with regard to the good while in
the hands of the buyer is therefore arguable.
Contemporary jurists have permitted the buyer to provide security to the seller for his purchase. The only restriction imposed in this regard is that the security instrument (as well as the "promissory note," if any) be entered
into only after ownership of the object of sale has transferred from the seller to the buyer, since the buyer only
becomes indebted to the seller once the sale takes
place.13 3 It may be permissible, however, for the seller to
take security from the buyer prior to the sale, provided
SHERMAN

A.

JACKSON, ON THE BOUNDARIES OF THEOLOGICAL ACCEPTANCE IN

ABU IAMID AL-GHAZALI'S FAYSAL AL-TAFRIQA BAYNA AL-ISLAM WA AL-ZANDAQA

88

(2002) (translating the Islamic legal term hila as "legal dodge").
127. See id.
128. SAEED, supra note 17, at 92-95.
129. See ZuHAvLI, supra note 61, at 627-89.
130. USMANI, supra note 44, at 106-08.

131. According to Professor Vogel, Islamic law does not hold liable a trustee
[amin] unless he or she has negligently or intentionally damaged the item. See VOGEL &
HAYES, supra note 4, at 112-14.
132. Shari'ah committees require that this sale take place through an offer by the
buyer and an acceptance thereof by the seller, provided that the sale is not made a
condition to the agency agreement or a condition to the purchase of the buyer as agent
for the seller. In order to accomplish this requirement, Shari'ah committees are typically content so long as the sale takes place under a separate written instrument. While
documenting each sale in separate written documents may be advisable, doing so would
not create separate contractual agreements since the parties already have in mind the
agency agreement or subsequent purchase when initially entering into the contract.
133. USMANI, supra note 44, at 109.
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that the security remains the seller's responsibility.'3 4
Typically, the security instrument and/or "promissory
note" are simply executed moments after the sale documentation is completed in the same closing. It is important to note that in instances of default, as mentioned
previously, the price to be paid by the buyer cannot be
increased. Instead, the buyer may be obligated to reimburse the seller for costs actually incurred as a result of
the delinquent payment or to donate some amount to a
charity.
Contemporary jurists have also permitted a guaranty. According to the classical ruling, no fee may be charged for
providing this guaranty. Contemporary jurists, while citing this ruling, have begun to question its efficacy.' 35 It is
hoped that if the classical position'is reversed, it will come
about not by what has become, among Shari'ah committees, the usual reference to the "rule of necessity" - an
oblique way of deriving law - but by a more fundamental analysis that looks to the 'dal and hikam - and
thereby to the substance - of the original rulings.
4. Determination of Price

Jurists agree on the importance of disclosing the amount of
the purchase price and its components. They differ, however as
to the constituents of the purchase price. Ibn Rushd, a classical
jurist of the Maliki school of jurisprudence, organizes into three
categories what may be factored into the price: (1) that which
can be included by the seller as part of its Principal Cost and
which may be factored into the calculation of the profit; (2) that
which can be included by the seller as part of its Principal Cost
but not factored into the calculation of profit; and (3) that
which cannot be included as part of the seller's Principal Cost
136
nor used in the calculation of profit.
For the Maliki school of jurisprudence, expenses of the first
category are those relating to the essence of the goods [ta'thirfi
ayn], such as dying or tailoring a piece of material which is to be
sold.' 3 7 In other words, all costs customarily associated with the
134. Id. at 127.
135. Id. at 129-31.
136. 2 IBN RUSHD, THE DISTINGUISHED JURIST'S PRIMER: A TRANSLATION OF BIDAYAT
AL-MUJTAHID 256 (Imran Ahsan Khan Nyazee trans., 1996).
137. NABIL A. SALEH & AHMAD AjAJ, UNLAWFUL GAIN AND LEGITIMATE PROFIT IN
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object of sale and which result in an increase in its value may be
appended to the Principal Cost. Expenses of the second category do not affect the essence of the good and are those incurred for services that the seller requires but cannot itself provide, such as transportation or storage. Expenses of the third
category are those that do not affect the essence of the good and
which are incurred for services the seller himself is able to pro1 3
vide, such as commissions or wages to its employees.
The Hanbali school of jurisprudence holds that all actual
expenses incurred by the seller may be added to the Principal
Cost provided that the buyer is made aware of the nature and
amount of such expenses. 139 The Shafi'i school rules similarly.1 4 For the Hanafi school, all amounts normally accepted
by commercial practice and actually incurred by the seller may
be added to the Principal Cost. 4 '
It should also be noted that the seller must make certain
disclosures with regard to the amounts constituting and charac14 2
teristics of the price.
5. Right of Rescission
In certain instances, the contract may be unmade or undone from the beginning. According to the majority ruling, in
the event of a mistake with regard to the amount or the characteristics of the purchase price (such as whether the seller purchased on a deferred basis) and a defect in the good, the buyer
is granted the option either to return the object and be refunded the total purchase price, or to receive a price reduction
IsLAMIC LAw:

RIBA, GHARAR, AND ISLAMiC BANKING 118 (Graham & Trotman 1992)

(1986).
138. See IBN RUSHD, supra note 136, at 347. See also SALEH & AJAJ, supra note 137, at
118.
139. SALEH & AJAJ, supra note 137, at 118.
140. Id. at 118-19.
141. ZUHAYLI, supra note 61, at 357.
142. For instance, if the seller initially purchased the object on a deferred basis, he
must disclose this fact to the buyer. Id. (stating that "[t]his follows since deferment
normally results in an increase over the cash-and-carry price"). The jurist al-Shafi'i
opines that the buyer is to be given a deferral period mirroring that of the seller. See id.
If the seller purchased the object in exchange for a debt, he need not disclose this fact
to the buyer. Only the price (i.e., the amount of debt) needs be disclosed. If the seller
purchased the object as compensation for an unpaid loan, it may not be resold using
murabahah with the price as the original loan amount. See id.
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and retain the object.' 4 3 The Hanbali school asserts that the sale
remains binding in the event the price is erroneous, but its price
must be corrected.' 4 4 The Shafi'i school holds that the price is
to be corrected and the profit accordingly reduced. 14 5 There
are many more rulings in this regard, and to enumerate them all
would fall outside the scope of this Article.
6. Contemporary Criticisms
Common criticisms of contemporary murabahah transactions stem from the function and role of the seller and the practical implementation of the transactions. Finance on the basis of
profit and loss sharing, with which the theoretical model of Islamic banking is identified substantively, does not seem to be a
dominant characteristic of modern murabahah sales. Of course,
the criticism that contemporary murabahah does not comport
with the original spirit of Islam is a criticism that can just as easily
be directed toward the entire practice of contemporary Islamic
finance. The very substance of a murabahah dictates, among
other things, that the seller be exposed to the risks normally associated with ownership, such as the risk of loss, damage, and
deterioration of the goods prior to delivery. The seller must also
accept the buyer's ability to return the good and rescind the sale
if the goods are damaged, deficient, do not meet the buyer's
preferences, or involve a mistake in pricing.
In engaging in murabahah transactions as sellers, Islamic
banks do not share in the profits and losses of their customers,
rather they assume the role typical of conventional banks. In
some cases, the risks normally associated with ownership are
transferred contractually to the buyer. In other instances, the
seller does in fact bear such risks from the time of purchase until
the time of delivery, leading some to argue that the bank takes a
risk, which justifies the profit, until the client fulfills his original
promise to purchase the commodity. 146 The counterargument is
that the seller does not really own the good, never truly has physical or even constructive possession of the good, and owns the
item for only moments, as both sales are concluded at the same
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id. at 357-58.
IBN RUSHD, supra note 136, at 258.
Id.
See SAEED, supra note 17, at 85-87.
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closing. Effectively, the seller-bank does not bear the risks of
ownership.
Rights of the customer-buyer, such as the right to inspect
the goods and the right to rescind the sale, are typically nullified
or shifted so they become beneficial to the seller rather than to
the buyer. Some classical jurists held that such reallocations
could take place if buyers were to affirmatively waive their rights.
Affirmative waivers do not occur as often as constructive waivers
in contemporary Islamic finance.
Moreover, according to many murabahah contracts, the
buyer is responsible for compliance with all applicable laws and
regulations, including those relating to the import of goods.' 4 7
In short, the seller-bank has now effectively avoided many, if not
all, of the risks and responsibilities that classical jurisprudence
expects it to bear.
The risk that the buyer may refuse to buy is avoided by
means of an advance payment, "promissory note" security, thirdparty guaranty, and/or contract terms, such as those mentioned
previously.1 4 8 Some Islamic financial institutions use these measures well in advance of purchasing the item and deposit assets
and collateral to be held until they have been fully paid. Typically, for example, the advance payment amount would be sufficient to cover any loss that may occur from a refusal by the
buyer. Alternatively, the seller-bank may contractually be afforded the right, if the customer-buyer refuses delivery, "to sell
the goods at the prevailing price in the market ... [and if such
sale price is insufficient] to demand from the client the balance
[of what is due to the Bank, including the profit margin]."' '
Perhaps the factors discussed above led the Council of Islamic
147. Id. at 92. For example, a murabahah contract of Faisal Islamic Bank of Egypt
states:
The client is responsible for all other expenses, which are not included in the
cost structure of this [Murabaha] [sic] contract, and also for all costs arising
from cancellation of a documentary credit, or refusal of the exporter to supply
the goods. The client does not have any right to demand from the Bank any
compensation in case the exporter refuses to supply the goods for any reason
whatsoever.
Id.
148. Providing security or giving a guaranty for a debt are not in itself reprehensible or prohibited under Islamic law, but there are specific rules for each.
149. SAEED, supra note 17, at 86 (quoting the murabahah contract of the Faisal
Islamic Bank of Egypt).
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Ideology to comment that in murabahah transactions, there is
"the possibility of some profit for the banks without the risk of
having to share in the possible losses, except in the case of bankruptcy or default on the part of the buyer."' 50 It is argued, thus,
that contemporary murabahahprovides the bank with a predetermined return on capital. 5 '
As mentioned previously, penalties and fees for late payments were prohibited traditionally but are now allowed in a
somewhat conspicuous fashion as part of most modern Islamic
financial transactions. Some contemporary jurists have observed
that the penalty imposed is actually calculated by means of a
bank doing nothing more than examining its normal rates of
return. This is not dissimilar to conventional banks' seeking to
152
recover the opportunity cost of their capital.

In cases of other Islamic financial institutions, the penalty
does differ from those found in conventional banking. In our
experience, we have seen penalties equal to specified amounts
that have no relation to the amount of indebtedness. We have
also seen penalties equaling a percentage of the delinquent payment amounts and charged once per delinquent payment without recurrence or compounding. In other instances, we observed institutions charge a percentage of the delinquent
amount and agree contractually to deduct their expenses from
this amount and to donate the excess to charity.
150. Id. at 87.
151. See id. at 95. Predetermined profit on the investment of money is typically
deemed to be an unlawful gain, which is prohibited under Islamic law. See e.g., USMANI,
supra note 44, at 50. Rather, an investor must share in the profits and losses, if any, in a
business venture or underlying physical asset. Profit sharing ratios may be specified,
but profit itself may not be assured. See id.
152. The Faisal Islamic Bank of Egypt's standard murabahah contract states:
Since the bank does not deal with interest, any delay in paying the installments
when they are due as agreed upon causes serious harm to the bank, which
requires compensation. This is on the basis of the [S]hari'a[h] rule that no
harm should be inflicted on any party [to the contract], which is the basis of
transactions.... [T]he two parties agree that in case of delay by the second
party in paying any installment on its due date, the bank has a right, without
any objection or dispute [by the client], to demand compensation for any
damages occurred because of the delay. The value of this damage will be calculated on the basis of average realised profit for the period in addition to any
other compensations. Any dispute in relation to whether [Faisal Islamic Bank
of Egypt] deserves compensation or not, or the value of such compensation
will be decided by the [religious supervisory board of the Islamic bank].
SAEED, supra note 17, at 90-91.

2003]

A FIRST IMPRESSION OF ISLAMIC FINANCE

Forecasting the abuse of murabahah transactions discussed
above, as well as those present in the case of Symphony Gems, discussed in Part II infra, Justice Taqi Usmani writes:
It should never be overlooked that, originally, murabahah is
not a mode of financing. It is only a device to escape from
"interest" and not an ideal instrument for carrying out the
real economic objectives of Islam. Therefore, this instrument
should be used as a transitory step taken in the process of the
Islamization of the economy, and its use should be restricted
15 3 and musharakaht 54 [a
only to those cases where mudarabah
55
practicable.'
not
are
partnership]
What the foregoing illustrations and our own experience
impress upon and instill in us is the realization that increasing
instances of superficial overlap between Islamic financial practices and conventional practices - based on formalistic adherence to Islamic law - are coming at an immense expense to the
spirit and wisdom of the Shari'ah. The facts and outcome of
Symphony Gems constitute the latest indication of the rising irrelevance of Islamic jurisprudence to Islamic finance, as this is a case
in which an ostensibly Islamic contract (a murabahah) made by
an Islamic financial institution by its own terms invoked the coverage of a non-Islamic legal system and the jurisdiction of a nonMuslim court. No contemporary jurist ought to overlook the onslaught being inflicted upon the integrity of Islamic law as the
essential aspects of the Shari'ah - those which, for instance, allow jurists to argue that one mode of transaction is categorically
better than another - are altogether being driven out of Islamic
finance, in large part because contemporary jurists have failed to
recognize that arriving at a formal concordance between Islamic
finance and conventional finance need not and should not
mean setting aside an active utilization of the tools and techniques of Islamic jurisprudence when Islamic jurisprudence itself comprises the only gateway Islamic finance may avail itself of
to reach Shari'ah compliance.
153. Mudarabah is a contract whereby a party entrusts another party with the investment and management of its money or other assets. For further detail, see ZUHAYLI,
supra note 61, at 483-515; SAEED, supra note 17, at 51-59, 69-75; SALEH & AJAJ, supra note
137, at 126-43.
154. For an explanation of musharakah, see ZUHAYLI, supra note 61, at 445-82;
SALEH & AJAJ, supra note 137, at 113-17; SAEED, supra note 17, at 59-75.
155. USMANI, supra note 44, at 104-05.
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II. ISLAMIC INV. CO. OF THE GULF (BAHAMAS) LTD. V.
SYMPHONY GEMS N.V. & OTHERS
A. U.K. Court Construing Islamic Law
Islamic Investment Company of the Gulf (Bahamas) Ltd. v. Symphony Gems N.V. & Others156 ("Symphony Gems") is a watershed
decision not only because it is the first case concerning the construction of an Islamic financial transaction to be brought before
a U.K. court. 15 7 The case is also of great value because it highlights some of the most pressing challenges facing the development and refinement of Islamic finance as a contemporary practice. One significant challenge is the question of how actors on
both sides of the Islamic-conventional divide ought to go about
integrating Islamic finance into the scheme of conventional finance. Heard before the High Court of Justice Queen's Bench
Division Commercial Court, and decided on February 13, 2002,
by Justice Tomlinson, Symphony Gems centers on a financing facility based on the previously discussed murabahah contract as set
forth by the transacting parties in a "Morabaha [sic] Financing
Agreement."
B. The ContractualDispute in Symphony Gems
In January 2000, the claimant Islamic Investment Company
of the Gulf (Bahamas) Ltd. ("IICG") entered into a murabahah
financing agreement (the "Contract") with the defendant Symphony Gems N.V. ("Symphony"). The Contract envisaged that
IICG would provide a revolving purchase and sale facility to enable Symphony to purchase certain inventory, namely precious
stones and gems. The Contract, according to the terms contained in its recitals, intended for the financing to follow the
form of a murabahah transaction and, thereby, to be in compliance with the Shari'ah.
The Contract clearly identified the structure of the purported murabahah transaction whereby Symphony, as buyer,
would identify precious gems or stones that IICG, as seller,
would purchase and immediately resell to Symphony at an
agreed-upon profit margin. The Contract made further refer156. 2002 WL 346969 (Q.B. Com. Ct. Feb. 13, 2002).
157. As of yet, no commercial case involving Islamic finance has appeared in a U.S.
court.
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ence to a purchase contract (the "Purchase Contract"), an agreement whereby IICG would purchase the gems from a supplier
and sell the same to Symphony. If and when Symphony ever
sought to use the financing facility, it was to issue an irrevocable
offer to IICG identifying the gems to be financed, as well as the
supplier of such gems and other relevant contractual details including the date of payment by IICG to the supplier (the "Settlement Date"). This offering document could be accepted by
IICG no later than the second business day preceding the Settlement Date. If accepted, a Purchase Contract would have been
formed that, among other things, contained a definition of the
"Cost Price" (the price payable by IICG to the supplier of the
gems) and a definition of the "Sale Price," (the price payable by
Symphony to IICG in installment payments). The difference between the Cost Price and the Sale Price included an agreedupon margin that would correspond to IICG's profit on the
transaction.
Before the Contract could be made to take effect, however,
a number of other documents were required to be executed as
conditions precedent, including a
form of offer, form of acceptance, form of personal guarantee, form of bank guarantee, form of deed of pledge, form of
collection agreement, form of assignment of receivables
agreement, form of market rate agreement and form of letter
from Beautiful Diamond Ltd . . . [and] three legal counsels'
opinions, two from
Belgian legal counsel and one from Swiss
58
legal counsel. 1
The Contract specified details relating to the passage of title
and various conditions precedent which Symphony was required
to satisfy before utilizing the financing facility. When IICG engaged in a purchase under the Contract, IICG was to forward
payment to the account of the supplier designated by Symphony,
which in turn was "absolutely, unconditionally and irrevocably"159 obligated to purchase the gems from IICG. In fact, Symphony was obliged to inform the gem supplier that upon passage
of title to IICG, such title would immediately thereafter pass to
Symphony. Pursuant to the Contract's terms, Symphony accepted personal responsibility for selecting each proposed sup158. Islamic Inv. Co. of the Gulf (Bahamas) Ltd., 2002 WL at *5-6.
159. Id. at *2.
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plier of the gems and for payment to the supplier regardless of
any "defect, deficiency or any loss or any breach" 6 ' of the sale
between the suppler and IICG. Symphony was further obligated
to pay IICG for the full amount of the gems regardless of
whether title or the goods themselves had passed to IICG or
Symphony. The seller was in no way liable contractually for the
condition or quantity of the goods and their compliance with
whatever expectations or arrangements Symphony might have
with the gem supplier. According to the Contract, risk relating
to the goods was to be borne by IICG for so long as IICG bore
title to such goods, though IICG expressly disclaimed any liability for the goods while in transit. According to its own terms, the
Contract was to be governed by, and construed in accordance
with, English law and was subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of
the English court. Lastly, it should be noted, the obligations of
Symphony under the Contract were guaranteed by two personal
guarantors.
The Court notes that it consulted with two experts in the
area of Islamic law and has been briefed on the nature of
murabahah contracts. One such expert, Dr. Yahya al-Samaan, is
quoted by the court as explaining the contemporary murabahah
to be "a transaction intended to assist a person who seeks to
purchase goods of a certain description but who is unable to pay
for the goods in cash."1 6' 1 He continued, "As viewed by Islamic
jurists, the Morabaha [sic] contract was originally a contract in
respect of a commodity available in the market. However, Islamic banks have given the Morabaha [sic] contract a wider interpretation that includes the importation by the relevant bank of
specified goods from abroad."'16 2 The court comments that although the Contract is prima facie governed by English law (because it states so and there is no reason to refute the parties'
preference), "it is equally critical to note that that Dr. Samaan,
after examining the nature and terms of the [C]ontract comes
to the conclusion that ...

the [Contract] does not have the es-

160. Id.
161. Id. at *4.
162. Id. Dr. al-Samaan is said also to have gone on to describe what this Article has
explained as to the mechanics of murabahah sales, supra Part LE, detailing the two
promises made by the contracting parties, the requirement of actual possession by the
seller-bank, and its liability during such possession.
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sential characteristics of a Morabahah [sic] contract."' 16" No
doubt Dr. Samaan's denial that the Contract is a murabahahsale
provides additional - though unnecessary - support for the
court's finding that the Contract must be construed "according
164
to its terms as an English law contract."'
C. Facts and Posture of Symphony Gems
In February 2000, Symphony identified a company named
Precious Ltd. ("Precious"), located in Hong Kong, which was to
supply a very large quantity of rough diamonds. Symphony
noted these facts in its two offers to IICG sent on February 10th
and 21st. These offers stated Settlement Dates of February 14th
and 25th, respectively, and IICG accepted these offers on the
12th and 24th of February, respectively. IICG then proceeded to
make payment in full to the account of Precious, although no
payment had yet been made by Symphony.
During the period preceding litigation, the defendants
(Symphony and its two guarantors) posited that Precious was a
reputable diamond broker and that it had paid amounts to obtain certain rough diamonds to a sight holder, which in turn
failed to honor its commitment to Precious. The failure came as
the result of an ongoing family dispute between one of the guarantors of Symphony and his two brothers who controlled the
company to which Precious had made payment to acquire the
goods under the Contract. Extensive correspondence primarily
between Symphony and Precious followed. Correspondence
from the defendants to IICG, however, did not contend that
their failure to pay came as a consequence of their not having
received the goods.
When Symphony did not repay IICG in full, IICG enforced
the security it had been granted and sought to reclaim the balance of unpaid amounts by instituting proceedings for summary
judgment on the basis of nonpayment. Symphony responded by
asserting non-delivery of the goods. The court rejected this defense relying on "proper construction of the [Contract],' 63 citing several sections of the Contract in which delivery was not
mentioned as a prerequisite to payment by Symphony.
163. Islamic Inv. Co. of the Gulf (Bahamas) Ltd., 2002 WL at *4-5.
164. Id. at *5.
165. Id. at *8.
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Symphony also contended that since the Contract was in reality a purchase and sale agreement, IICG's claim to recover the
Sale Price should fail because there had been no delivery to Symphony. In response to this argument, the court held that the
absence of delivery could arise only if Symphony had failed to
make the necessary arrangements.
Symphony's argument that the Contract violated the principle of illegality was also rejected. Symphony claimed that because some part of the transaction took place under the laws of
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia where the Contract would be prohibited, the principle of illegality should be applied to render
the Contract unenforceable. The court held, however, that that
portion of the transaction occurring or having a nexus to Saudi
Arabia was so minor that the principle of illegality could not successfully be invoked.
Lastly, the defendants put forth an argument of ultra vires.
The court assumed, without deciding, that the Contract would
be deemed invalid as a murabahah and would therefore be inconsistent with IICG's charter, which demands compliance with Islamic law in all its dealings. Analyzing the ultra vires law of the
Bahamas, where IICG is chartered, the court found that IICG
was not subject to the ultra vires doctrine. Accordingly, even if
the Contract may have been shown to be beyond the scope of its
objects, it could not have been set aside or avoided on the
grounds that it was void ab initio.
Symphony's attempt to avoid paying liquidated damages to do so would be contrary to Islamic law according to many contemporary jurists - was rejected by the court on the grounds
that the claim was brought under English law by a Bahamas company, and not a Saudi Arabia company. The law of the Bahamas
as passed through the English court does not prohibit the payment of riba.
D. Analysis of Symphony Gems
1. Was the Contract a Valid Murabahah?
As already noted by Dr. A1-Samaan at trial, the Contract fell
short as a murabahah sale because the required shurut were not
present. In this sense the Contract is, based on our experiences,
fairly representative of many, if not most, purported murabahah
transactions in contemporary Islamic finance. Specifically, the
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contracting parties ignored the requirements that IICG own
and/or possess the goods for sale." 6 The supplier, in this case
Precious, was simply to send the goods directly to the buyer,
thereby bypassing the seller. The various risks of ownership typically borne by the seller in a valid murabahah were avoided by
having title immediately transfer to Symphony and by contractually shifting several responsibilities normally borne by the seller
to the buyer.16 7 Other Islamic legal rights were discarded, such
as that of Symphony to reject the goods if certain defects were
found to be present. 68 The notion that Symphony was responsible for payment to IICG regardless of delivery is a notion that
obviously parallels an obligation to repay indebtedness more
closely than it parallels how payments are typically made in a
spot sale. Though it is possible that Symphony waived its Islamic
legal rights and chose to bear these responsibilities itself, it
seems more likely, given the circumstances of this case and the
superior bargaining posture inherent to commercial banks, that
IICG sought to mimic conventional interest-bearing financing to
the greatest extent possible by imposing these provisions upon
its customer Symphony.
Even if the Contract were to constitute a valid murabahah
sale, conventional finance would consider its structure and procedures a curious and awkward deviation from the most efficient
and optimal course of business. Moreover, since the parties deviated from the Shari'ah anyway - an argument that can be
made, we posit, against most contemporary versions of Islamic
contracts - the transaction seems even more awkward, if not
ludicrous. Given the manner in which typical murabahah sales
(and most Islamic financial transactions) are carried out today,
we wonder about the extent to which the jurists who sit on
Shari'ah committees at Islamic financial institutions actually
meditate on the wisdom their legal reasoning is supposed to contain rather than rely mainly on the formal aspects of what they
approve, based on mere appearance, as Shari'ah-compliant.
2. Governing Law
Parties to Islamic finance transactions often assert English
166. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 123-35 and accompanying text.
168. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.

190

FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 27:150

or New York law as the governing law relying on the probability
that the contracts are more likely to be enforced as written. Symphony Gems certainly bolsters the case for such reliance. Both
Symphony and IICG sought to benefit by choosing, ab initio, a
jurisdiction and a law which they expected would enforce the
Contract as written, rather than refraining it, if necessary, as a
true -

or truer -

murabahah sale. Perhaps they knew, or at

least should have known since they had a Shari'ah committee
advising them, that their transaction was blatantly problematic
from an Islamic legal perspective. Nonetheless, at trial Symphony still nominally invoked the Shari'ah in an effort to defend
itself and minimize its financial liability.
If a hypothetical Islamic court had jurisdiction over the dispute, it could have overlooked the invocation of English law and
enforced the transaction based on the parties' intent to transact
Islamically, just the same way the English court overlooked the
Islamic legal form to enforce the transaction pursuant to English
law. If the hypothetical Islamic court had construed the transaction as a murabahah sale, it would have applied the fiqh (akin in
many respects to regulations) relating to murabahah sales. It
would have found the transaction to be batil or fasid, depending
on the school of jurisprudence applied. This ruling might very
well have resulted in an outcome more favorable to Symphony.
One cannot predict, however, whether the hypothetical court
would have gone so far as to find the transaction to be abusive,
or even a legal contrivance [hila]. Nor can one predict whether
the hypothetical court would have sought to undo the deal altogether or even to reprimand the parties.
3. Documenting the Agreement
As mutually unfamiliar first principles and legal concepts
mingle, contemporary Islamic finance and the transactions composing it can be a challenging, if not an essentially impossible,
activity. First and foremost, the transaction must be documented in a manner agreed upon by the parties with their various Shari'ah committees and understandings of Islamic law.
Documentation must comply with applicable local law, and, to
the extent possible, Islamic law. Of course, where there is a conflict between Islamic and local laws, local law must prevail. As
noted earlier, to ensure compliance with Islamic law, Shari'ah
committees often seek out and rely on tenuous opinions with
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which they as jurists may even intellectually disagree and which
barely pass muster under the rubric of Islamic jurisprudence. In
other instances, transactional lawyers resort to oblique drafting
techniques and the use of legal contrivances to please the transacting parties and their Shari'ah advisors.
External pressures, especially those arising out of the desire
for favorable tax treatment, are known to influence the way Islamic financial transactions are documented. As perhaps can be
expected, parties prefer favorable tax treatment, such as having
the ability to deduct interest payments from taxable income, although this may, in many, but not necessarily all cases, result in
less substantive adherence to the Shari'ah. For their part, tax
regulators may need to see in the transaction certain structural
elements as well as certain key legal expressions before granting
favorable treatment. In contrast, Shari'ah committees, instead
of concerning themselves with what is meant by the conventional
legal expression, seem to prefer to altogether forego examination of tax issues and tax documentation. In our experience,
Shari'ah committees do not always concern themselves with the
tax (and, to a lesser extent, accounting) treatment of Islamic financial transactions, contending that such treatment per se does
not render such transactions impermissible from an Islamic
point of view. Nevertheless, the tension of arguing to one party,
such as the retail public, that an instrument is not interest-bearing,' 6 9 while asserting to tax regulators that it is, poses serious
ethical concerns for jurists and leads to incoherent rulings and
internal dissonance. 7 ' Those factors also highlight the lack of
169. Muslims conversant in English do not usually appreciate the technical difference between the Islamic legal term "iba" and the conventional finance term "interest"
and often use the terms interchangeably as if they were direct translations of one another (which they are not).
170. The notion that Islamic law is itself unpredictable and unstable is often erroneously stated by many and the incoherence evident among juristic rulings relating to
Islamic finance serves only to exacerbate this existing problem. Federal law has made
reference to Islamic lawmaking using the term qadi (the Arabic term for a judge or
justice and sometimes spelled kadi or cadi) to indicate a system of arbitrary lawmaking.
See e.g., Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 11 (1949) (commenting "[w]e do not sit like
a kadi under a tree dispensing justice according to considerations of individual expediency"); United States v. Murray, 621 F.2d 1163, 1169 (lst Cir. 1980) (analogizing unreasoned and "unprincipled" administrative rulings to "decisions of Kadi at the gate");
Colonial Trust v. Goggin, 230 F.2d 634, 636 (9th Cir. 1955) (commenting that this
court cannot apply "such abstract theory of justice which might be entertained by an
oriental cadi"); Clark v. Harleysville Mut. Casualty Co., 123 F.2d 499, 502 (1941) (stating
"[w]e sit, after all, as an appellate cotrt, administering justice under the law, not as an
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any intellectual discourse whatsoever among contemporary jurists regarding the direct transferability between Islamic legal
and conventional legal regimes of basic concepts and definitions. It is highly problematic that contemporary Islamic jurists
tend to assume without arguing that any given English or U.S.
technical legal term such as, inter alia, "sale," "loan," or "property," magically satisfies the Islamic legal definition for such
word's non-technical Arabic correspondent.
CONCLUSION
As societies constantly change, the legal particulars [fiqh] of
Islam as they pertain to financial transactions also must modulate and adapt if application of the Shari'ah is to remain relevant
to contemporary human life and thought, lest they become
drowned out by the cacophony and internal dissonance created
by stagnant and intellectually bereft scholarship. In the face of
such necessity, we propose that the Islamic financial complex,
together with the broader faculty of contemporary jurists and
mujtahids worldwide, set forth to build, or rebuild, a complete
Islamic financial-legal system utilizing as a bridge, but not as a
foundation the terminology and ideas of the modern financial
system which are today in ascendancy. This proposed Islamic financial-legal system would not be merely a high-handed imitation of conventional financial norms reliant on the very letter
and spirit of the modern system it is meant to displace. Rather,
it would be an organic continuation of classical Islamic financial
understandings and practices, unlike the translated mimicry
which constitutes contemporary Islamic finance.
ancient oriental cadi, dispensing a rough and ready equity according to the dictates of
his own unfettered discretion"). Legal scholars have refuted this stereotype. See e.g.,
Makdisi, supra note 88, at 63-66.
For a thorough and enlightening discussion of judicial process, adjudication and
judicial discretion, as well as the notion of precedent generally, see MOHAMMED FADEL,
ADJUDICATION IN THE MALIKI MADHHAB: A STUDY OF LEGAL PROCESS IN MEDIEVAL ISLAMIC
LAw (1995). The role of principles in the development and exposition of the law is
demonstrated briefly but well by Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Qawa'id al-Fiqh: The Legal
Maxims of Islamic Law, at http://www.anl.org.uk/journal/. For a discussion of the relationship between Islamic law and the Common Law, see John A. Makdisi, The Islamic
Origins of the Common Law, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1635 (1999). While it may be true that
Islamic law as used today - in contrast with the classical or medieval periods - in the
practice of contemporary Islamic finance and banking has made Islamic law seem unpredictable and unstable, to blame solely Islamic law and its jurists of yesterday and
today would be a shallow understanding of the matter.
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There is no reason why lawyers and financiers today cannot
be loyal to the content of classical Islamic financial law, as well as
to the intellectual and metaphysical spirit that gave rise to it,
without necessarily having to duplicate its various forms. As Symphony Gems demonstrates, the attempt merely to manipulate
form at the expense of spiritual substance can be, at worst, an
exercise in either folly or futility, or both. At best, its results can
be no more than formally sufficient, yet substantively bereft.
With a firm foundation in the roots and substance of the
Shari'ah, particularly the science of usul al-fiqh which is all too
often ignored in the present day, Islamic jurists and mujtahids
together with lawyers and financiers can work towards building a
contemporary Islamic financial system according to the Islamic
religion, but through concepts derived from the English language and current in Anglo-American law, since English is now
the most universal language of thought and Anglo-American law
the most universal model of governance.
By using Anglo-American legal concepts as a starting point
rather than an ending point, while focusing on the substance
and purposes of the Shari'ah, the result would be that a lawyer
or financier involved in Islamic finance need not try, on the one
hand, to build an Islamic financial complex based on conventional economic principles, and, on the other hand, to think in
an Arabic manner while simultaneously reading and writing in
English. This balancing act can be undertaken if jurists and
mujtahids meet four criteria. First, they should develop a universal set of financial-legal maxims, representing the distilled essence of Islamic law, which would serve to inform and guide professionals undertaking Islamic finance. Second, they should cultivate an appreciation for, if not comprehension of, the Islamic
wisdom tradition."7 ' Third, they should return to using the pow171. See WILLIAM

C. CHITICK, THE HEART OF ISLAMIC PHILOSOP-tY:

THE QUEST FOR

66 (2001). The Islamic
wisdom tradition sets the goal of knowing oneself in terms of the Absolute Being that
brought the universe into existence, and of acting in accordance with what this knowledge demands. Thus, Islamic wisdom, and any discipline seen through its lens,
can only understand human beings in terms of the unity of the human world
and the natural world. There is no place in this tradition to drive a wedge
between humans and the cosmos. In the final analysis the natural world is the
externalization of the human substance, and the human soul is the internalization of the realm of nature. Human beings and the whole universe are intimately intertwined, facing each other like two mirrors. The quest for wisdom
SELF-KNOWLEDGE IN THE TEACHINGS OF AFDAL AL-DIN KASHANi
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erful science of usul al-fiqh in place of the uncritical and unwise
reliance on fiqh which pervades Islamic finance today. Fourth,
they should facilitate and participate proactively in the development of a financial technology native to the soil of Islamic
thought. We cannot overemphasize the need for concentration
and vigilance to ensure that any transfer or continuation of
knowledge based on the foregoing criteria maintains transparency with regard to both the form and substance of Islamic
law, which the Anglo-American outcome is meant to render visd-vis the original Arabic outcome.
As long as this new expression of traditional Islamic financial law in the Anglo-American context remains true to its roots
in Islamic wisdom, its intrinsic economic justice would be universal. No person operating within this paradigm need necessarily
be Muslim to take advantage of its ultimate insistence on economic justice rather than only wealth enhancement. Yet, until
this new expression of Islamic financial law is developed and refined, Western courts will find themselves, as they continue to
rule on Islamic financial transactions, invoking an Islamic law
with faulty precedents such as Symphony Gems, where contemporary Islamic finance has made itself look, at best, incoherent, and
at worst, irrelevant.

can only succeed if the natural world is recognized as equivalent to one's own
self, just as one must see the whole human race as the external manifestation
of the potencies and possibilities of the human soul.

